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This study shows an economically significant relation between a firm‟s environmental 
performance and its cost of debt.  Firms that have poor environmental performance will 
face future environmental liabilities related to compliance and clean-up costs due to 
increasingly strict environmental laws and regulations.  Under current U.S. law, 
environmental liabilities can impair the value of fixed assets, as environmental claims 
often take precedence over the claims of creditors.  Thus, future environmental liabilities 
are of particular concern to creditors.  Previous accounting research has shown that a 
firm‟s market value of equity is significantly affected by its environmental performance.  
However, the same has yet to be shown for a firm‟s cost of debt capital.  This study 
focuses on a sample of U.S. pulp and paper firms.  The results imply that the market 
applies an „environmental risk‟ premium of thirty-eight basis points to the cost of debt 
capital for the average public firm in the U.S. pulp and paper industry, based on its 
environmental performance.  Environmental performance is measured using the annual 
toxic release inventory of the United States Environmental Protection Agency.  It is a 
measure of the amount of toxic chemicals released to land, air and water by a firm‟s 
operating facilities.  This paper adds to the literature, providing evidence that 
environmental performance is a value relevant measure with regards to creditors.  Thus, 
recent calls in the United States for greater cooperation between the Securities and 
Exchange Commission and the Environmental Protection Agency should be addressed.   
These calls are for the reporting, on a firm-wide basis, of quantifiable data that is already 
required by the Environmental Protection Agency but is not typically available in detail 
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The objective of this paper is to provide evidence as to whether environmental 
performance is a measurable component of polluting firms‟ cost of debt.  Barth and 
McNichols (1994) find that unreported environmental liabilities significantly affect 
firms‟ equity values.  Graham, Northcut and Maher (2001), and Graham and Maher 
(2006), find that firms‟ cost of debt on new bond issues is affected by unreported 
environmental liabilities.  These studies use information from the U.S. Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) on what are known as Superfund sites.  These sites are the 
result of a legacy of pollution that take a number of years to be identified and often take 
decades to clean-up.  Thus, these papers relate to polluting activities that typically have 
taken place many years earlier.  Other research focuses on environmental performance, 
which relates firm value to contemporary measures of a firm‟s polluting activities.  
Cormier and Magnan (1997), and Clarkson, Li and Richardson (2004), use measures of 
environmental performance to show that a firm‟s equity value in a given year is affected 
by its environmental performance in that same year.   
 
Sharfman and Fernando (2008) look at environmental risk management and how it 
affects the weighted average cost of capital (WACC).  They use a one-year cross-section 
of a sub-set of the S&P 500 and find that the more effectively a firm manages its 
environmental risk, the lower its WACC.  However, they find a negative association 
between a firm‟s environmental risk management and their debt component of WACC.  
This result is mitigated by the fact that their measure of environmental risk management 
is not consistent with previous literature, is somewhat counter-intuitive and that industry 
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effects are inadequately controlled for.  This study extends Sharfman and Fernando 
(2008) by exploring a more powerful setting in which to examine a firm‟s cost of debt as 
they relate to environmental performance.  It follows Clarkson, Li and Richardson (2004) 
in focusing on the U.S. pulp and paper industry.  By using a single industry, significant 
inter-industry differences in operating activities and capital structure are controlled for.  
However, results that hold for the pulp and paper industry may not be generalisable to 
other industries.   
 
The U.S. Pulp and Paper industry is a major polluter and has been the focus of a number 
of studies in the environmental accounting literature (from Bragdon and Marlin, 1972, to 
Clarkson, Li and Richardson, 2004).  It is also the subject of a set of ever increasing 
cluster rules that require firms in the industry to progressively improve their pollution 
performance.  This makes it an appropriate industry to study for the purposes of assessing 
the impact of environmental performance on a firm‟s cost of debt.  I collect bond issue 
and trading data for firms in the U.S. pulp and paper industry from 1990 through 2006 by 
using a combination of the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database (FISD) and the 
Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE).  This allows for the calculation of a 
market-based cost of debt for any of these firms that either issue debt or have their debt 
traded, in any given year over the sample period, as reported by these databases.  To 
measure environmental performance (the independent variable of interest), I use the 
Toxic Release Inventory (TRI), reported annually by the U.S. Environmental Protection 




Using the TRI as a proxy for environmental performance in the U.S. pulp and paper 
industry follows the methodology of Clarkson, Li and Richardson (2004).  My results 
imply that in a given year, for each pound of toxic chemicals released per $1,000 of U.S. 
sales, the market applies a 17.13 basis point risk premium to the cost of debt capital (the 
average sample firm releases 2.2 pounds per $1,000 U.S. sales for an average premium of 
37.69 basis points).  I also find that the bond ratings of the sample firms are affected by 
their environmental performance.  For each pound of toxic chemicals released per $1,000 
of U.S. sales, the sample firms‟ bond ratings change by about one third of a rating point 
(for example, a rating point change would be a change from BBB+ to BBB). 
 
A firm‟s environmental performance is becoming an increasingly important facet of its 
overall operations.  The main contribution of this study is the evidence that 
environmental performance is relevant with respect to the value of outstanding debt.  
Thus, it should be part of a firm‟s external reporting requirements.  The TRI is already 
mandatory reporting with respect to the U.S. EPA and is publicly available, on a facility 
by facility basis.  However, attributing these facilities to their corporate parents can be a 
difficult and time consuming activity.  Requiring firms to aggregate this information and 
include it in their annual reports creates minimal incremental reporting costs, yet would 
provide value-relevant information to all debt holders.  This position is consistent with a 
2004 United Sates Government Accountability Office (GAO) report.  In this 2004 report, 
the GAO calls for more cooperation between the U.S. EPA and the U.S. Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) to improve tracking and create more transparency with 




Creditors and bond raters can expect that the costs related to a firm‟s current and past 
environmental performance will not be fully captured in its financial statements.  Thus, 
based on the evidence presented herein, it seems that they include environmental 
performance in their assessment of a firm‟s credit worthiness, over and above what may 
be evident in a firm‟s financial reports.  In more general terms, this study contributes to 
the long line of research on the determinants of the cost of debt.  It also contributes to the 
performance measurement literature.  Environmental performance is a value-relevant 
performance measure and should be accounted for when assessing the actions of a firm‟s 
management.   
 
The next section discusses the institutional and regulatory environment as it pertains to 
environmental liabilities.  Section 3 presents my hypotheses and reviews the literature 
from which they are derived.  In section 4, my empirical proxies and research design are 
presented.  In section 5, I discuss sample selection and present preliminary descriptive 
statistics.  The main results are presented and discussed in section 6.  Section 7 contains a 





2 Institutional and Regulatory Environment 
2.1 Early institutional framework 
The United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) was established in the early 
1970s in response to the environmental movement in the United States, which took hold 
in the mid to late 1960s.  This movement was quite strong and many parallels can be 
drawn between then and now with regards to environmental awareness.  The general 
institutional environment was one in which governments and regulators were beginning 
to look for ways to hold firms accountable for their polluting activities.  For example, at 
this time, the American Accounting Association established a committee which was 
given the charge “to develop measurement and reporting methods useful in 
communicating to internal and external users the effect of an organization‟s behaviour on 
the physical environment.”
1
  The committee‟s 1973 report concluded that more 
environmental disclosure would be required in the future and that environmental laws and 
regulations would have a material impact on firms‟ financial results.  Thus, already in the 
early 1970s, environmental liabilities were beginning to be considered material with 
regards to a firm‟s ongoing operations.  However, it was not until the Love Canal disaster 
of the late 1970s that the United States Congress gave the EPA its strongest law under 
which to force firms to address their environmental liabilities due to past pollution.  This 
was through the so-called Superfund, established by the United States Congress after 
Love Canal much in the same way that Sarbanes-Oxley came after the Enron and related 
accounting scandals of recent years. 
 
                                                 
1
 American Accounting Association committee on environmental effects of organizational behavior.  
Report of  Committee on environmental effects of organizational behavior (1973),  p. 75. 
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2.2 Current legal and regulatory environment in the United States 
 
With the establishment of the United States EPA, and its related state level agencies, it 
became the primary agency responsible for environmental monitoring and enforcement in 
the United States.  The most important laws the EPA operates under are the Resource 
Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA, also known as the Superfund).  
These laws are the EPA‟s primary tools in cleaning up contaminated sites, holding parties 
responsible for these clean-ups, and forcing compliance with environmental laws and 
regulations.  CERCLA is the specific law that came about as a direct result of the Love 
Canal disaster.  The EPA identifies sites where hazardous waste exists and, if a particular 
site meets its threshold for taking action, the site becomes a so-called Superfund site.
2
  
When the EPA identifies a Superfund site, it will identify potentially responsible parties 
(PRPs).  The PRPs will ultimately be held liable for the cost of site remediation and may 
also be assessed punitive damages. 
 
Liability under CERCLA is joint, several and strict.  Any current owner or operator of a 
contaminated site, or any owner or operator at the time the site was contaminated, can be 
held responsible for the entire clean-up costs.  Negligence does not have to be proven to 
hold a party responsible for clean-up costs; the contamination only has to exist.  Lenders 
have been held responsible for clean-up costs under CERCLA due to: foreclosure on a 
company‟s real assets, taking part in the operating of an insolvent company, and a lack of 
due diligence when providing funding to a polluting firm.   
                                                 
2





Turning to the pulp and paper industry in particular, the so-called cluster rules are a set of 
regulations addressing pollution in the industry.  The cluster rules are in the process of 
being phased in, the phase in having begun in February, 1998. Full implementation will 
be completed by 2014.  The first draft of these rules was released by the U.S. EPA in 
December 1993.  At that time the EPA estimated compliance costs of $4 billion, but the 
American Forestry and Paper Association (AFPA) estimated compliance costs at $11.5 
billion (Nichols, 1994; p. 81).  After lobbying from the pulp and paper industry, the rules 
that came into effect in 1998 were described as more „palatable‟ (Nichols, 1998, p. 71).
3
  
These rules apply to air and water emissions and effluent, and are technology based in 
nature.  A particular feature, noted by Clarkson, Li and Richardson (2004), is the best 
available technology requirement for water effluent, where industry requirements are set 
by the best performers in the industry.  Other concepts being applied are maximum 
achievable control technology (MACT) for air emissions, and best management practices 
(BMPs).  The timelines involved allow firms to take a proactive, leading role in 
complying with the cluster rules, or to take a minimum compliance approach.  Thus, the 
current legal environment is such that firms in the pulp and paper industry could have 
significant off-balance sheet environmental liabilities, based on their environmental 
performance.  All government environmental litigation aside, the United States is an 
extremely litigious society.  The threat that private litigation may exceed any government 
mandated clean-up costs always exists.     
 
                                                 
3
 For a detailed overview of the „cluster rules‟ see Nichols (1998). 
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2.3 Accounting standards and environmental liabilities 
 
There are many situations in which management may decide that a reasonable estimation 
cannot be made for an environmental liability.  Under Financial Accounting Standards 
Board (FASB) Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 5, Accounting for 
Contingencies (SFAS 5), if a reasonable estimation cannot be made, the liability need not 
be recognised in the current period.
4
  In the event that an amount is accrued, the potential 
for significant unreported liabilities still remains, as a variety of estimation techniques are 
allowed.  When a range of possible liabilities is estimated, the most likely amount is 
recorded.  In the case where each of the estimates is equally likely, it is acceptable to 
record the lowest amount (known minimum value).
5
  In both cases, when the liability is 
finally realised it can be much greater than the one reported at the time of the pollution.  
Thus, if the market is to assess a risk premium based on the environmental performance 
of a polluting firm, the financial statements for the year in which the pollution occurs 
cannot be the sole information source. 
 
The most recent financial reporting standard in the U.S. relating to environmental 
liabilities is FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Standards No. 143, Accounting for 
Asset Retirement Obligations (SFAS 143).  SFAS 143 came into effect for fiscal years 
beginning after June 15, 2002.  It requires the recognition of asset retirement obligations 
based on the concepts of FASB Statement of Financial Accounting Concepts No. 7, 
Using Cash Flow Information and Present Value in Accounting.  Firms must now 
recognise an annual expense and liability based on expected obligations with regards to 
                                                 
4
 Under SFAS 5 an accrual is made if a contingent liability is likely and can be reasonably estimated. 
5
 Interpretation No. 14 and Staff Accounting Bulletin No. 92 are the relevant guidance on this from FASB 
and the SEC respectively.   
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the de-commissioning of long-lived assets.  From a „fair value‟ perspective, this amount 
would be equal to the amount for which a third party will take over the liability.   
 
However, third parties do not typically take over future environmental liabilities.  If a 
third party market does not exist, the amount is based on discounting the expected future 
expense by the firm‟s cost of capital.  Using present value accounting, the more 
financially distressed a firm is, the greater the rate at which the future obligation is 
discounted and the lower the liability it must report.  Thus, based on SFAS 143, as a firm 
approaches bankruptcy, environmental liabilities due to the expected retirement of long-
lived assets approach zero.  This reporting may accurately reflect the liability from the 
aspect of the shareholder; however, from the perspective of a lender, the ability to make 
claims on a firm‟s assets will be affected by environmental liabilities. Another feature of 
SFAS 143 is that it only recognises asset retirement obligations as the result of operations 
up to the financial statement date.  It does not reflect asset retirement obligations that will 
be incurred as a result of normal, ongoing operations related to a polluting asset over its 
remaining life.  Current accounting standards and practice are such that a firm‟s future 
environmental liabilities can remain under reported, or un-reported, in their financial 
statements.   
 
Several SEC rules exist regarding the disclosure of environmental liabilities.  They are 
found in regulation S-K items 101, 103 and 303 covering a firm‟s business description, 
legal proceedings, and Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A), respectively.  
Firms must disclose their compliance with environmental laws and any environmental 
10 
 
contingencies which are reasonably likely to have a material financial impact on the firm.  
Potential liabilities that are material to the company‟s financial condition, or that exceed, 
in aggregate, ten percent of total assets must be disclosed.   
 
For example, Westvaco Corporation‟s business description for 1996 discusses its 
exposure to environmental laws and regulations.  It particularly touches on the expected 
impact of the cluster rules, providing a range of $175-400 million in capital expenditures 
to comply with the rules as they are implemented and additional annual operating costs of 
$25-50 million.  In the same year, Mead Corporation does not mention the cluster rules 
and the expected implementation costs, but Mead does disclose the number of sites at 
which it has been named as a PRP at federal EPA Superfund sites and that a reserve of 
$38 million has been established to address remediation costs.  Mead also explains that 
this estimate may be exceeded by up to $45 million.  An example of disclosures related to 
item 103, legal proceedings can be found in Kimberley-Clark‟s 10-Ks.  In 1994 it states 
that it is a PRP at 28 Superfund sites, whereas in the subsequent years it simply states that 
it is a PRP at „a number‟ of sites.  With regards to the MD&A, in 1999 Georgia Pacific‟s 
management states that capital expenditures to comply with the cluster rules are expected 
to be approximately $550 million through April 2006.  In general, the contingent nature 
of expected environmental liability and compliance costs is evident in the financial 
reporting of firms in the pulp and paper industry.   
 
This is supported by a number of studies.  A 1993 GAO report found that many 
companies were not properly aggregating their environmental liabilities when 
11 
 
determining materiality.  The requirement of Regulation S-K mandating disclosure of 
environmental liabilities if they exceed ten percent of assets was often being applied on a 
case by case basis, rather than in aggregate.  A 2004 report from the United States 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) calls for the SEC to create more transparency 
with regards to environmental liabilities.  It complains of a lack of coordination between 
the SEC and EPA in aggregating already available public information, noting that 
minimal effort has been exerted towards improvement.  A 2008 Ontario Securities 
Commission report finds that there is great disparity as to how firms disclose their 
environmental liabilities.  Based on these reports, it can be expected that the costs related 
to a firm‟s current and past environmental performance will not be captured accurately in 






3 Literature Review and Hypothesis Development 
3.1 Market-based evidence of off-balance sheet environmental liabilities 
 
Barth and McNichols (1994) use publicly available information to develop models they 
expect might have predictive power in determining the clean-up costs related to 
Superfund sites.  The explanatory variables in their models are available prior to the EPA 
releasing publicly its own estimates of clean-up costs.  The estimation equations, 
although with some significant results, show a low level of explanatory power.  Thus, 
they conclude that recording Superfund site related accruals would not be required under 
SFAS 5 based on their estimation method, at least prior to the EPA releasing its cost 
estimates.  However, they also use their explanatory variables as proxies for 
environmental liabilities in a market based model.  Barth and McNichols find that a 
significant liability, which is highly correlated with their proxies, is imputed into share 
price.  As their market model includes firms‟ book values of liabilities as a control 
variable, this environmental liability is over and above any already reported by the 
sample firms.  The most significant proxy used in the model is the number of times a firm 
is listed as a potentially responsible party at Superfund sites (compared to the other 
proxies, which are monetary estimates of remediation costs).  Their results estimate an 
average implicit liability of 28.6% of market value for firms that are named as potentially 
responsible parties on Superfund sites.  
 
In a paper focusing on three specific industry segments, Cormier and Magnan (1997) use 
water-based pollution data available from the Ontario and Quebec governments to create 
a proxy for implicit environmental liabilities.  Their pollution measure is based on a 
13 
 
firm‟s conformity to existing government regulations.  For the pulp and paper industry, 
Cormier and Magnan collect the Ontario and Quebec environment ministries‟ reports of 
the biochemical oxygen demand of water effluent from the operating facilities of their 
sample firms.  Water that has a higher biochemical oxygen demand is more polluted.  
This is then scaled by the respective environment ministries‟ allowed levels to create a 
measure of how well these firms meet or exceed government regulations.  Similar to 
Barth and McNichols (1994), Cormier and Magnan use the market value of equity as the 
dependent variable and then include their proxy for implicit environmental liabilities as 
an independent variable.  An important difference exists between the proxies used by 
Barth and McNichols and Cormier and Magnan.  Barth and McNichols use factors 
relating to Superfund sites.  These are sites where an implicit environmental liability 
exists due to past environmental performance, often from many years previous.  Cormier 
and Magnan are using a measure of current environmental performance as a proxy for 
implicit environmental liabilities.   
 
The results of Cormier and Magnan (1997) suggest inter-industry differences.  For their 
sample of pulp and paper firms, they find a significant link between environmental 
performance and the market value of equity.  They find less significant results for the 
firms categorised as chemicals and oil refiners, and weak results for the firms categorised 
as steel, metals and mining.  If within sample homogeneity is important, as suggested by 
the authors, a close inspection of the sample presents reasons for the variety of results.
6
  
The strength of the results for each industry category is consistent with the homogeneity 
                                                 
6
 For a full list of the sample firms used see: Cormier et al. (1993), Appendix 1. 
14 
 
of each category, indicating that the model may not be well-specified for heterogeneous 
groupings of firms.   
 
Another paper exploring the market valuations in relation to environmental performance 
(as a proxy for implicit environmental liabilities) is Clarkson, Li and Richardson (2004).  
Clarkson, Li and Richardson use a modified version of the Ohlson (1995) model to show 
that the market positively values environmental capital expenditures for low polluting 
firms; whereas, environmental capital expenditures are valued at zero for high polluting 
firms.  They look specifically at the U.S. pulp and paper industry, citing the EPA cluster 
rules and model specification (specifically noting Cormier and Magnan, 1997) as reasons 
for focusing on a single industry.  They use the United States Environmental Protection 
Agency‟s (EPA‟s) toxic release inventory (TRI) to partition firms in the pulp and paper 
industry into high and low polluters.  The TRI is a facility by facility report of the total 
toxic chemicals released to land, air and water.  It is made available to the public by the 
EPA on an annual basis.   
 
The results of Clarkson, Li and Richardson (2004) are consistent with their position: 
environmental capital expenditures made by low polluting firms are proactive measures 
that will provide future economic benefits; however, environmental capital expenditures 
made by high polluting firms provide no future economic benefit.  In other words, when 
these firms make environmental capital expenditures, low polluting firms are creating an 
asset by proactively avoiding future liabilities and high polluting firms are just paying off 
current liabilities.  Clarkson, Li and Richardson also find that the market assesses 
15 
 
significant, unreported environmental liabilities when valuing the high polluting firms in 
their sample.  Their estimate of unreported liabilities for these firms is equivalent to 16.6 
percent of market capitalisation. 
 
3.2 Environmental liabilities and the market value of debt 
The regulatory and legal environment, as described in section 2, is certainly one in which 
a prudent lender should be concerned about a borrower‟s environmental performance.  
Under current common-law, environmental liabilities can impair the value of fixed assets, 
as environmental claims often take precedence over the claims of creditors.  Graham and 
Maher (2006) look at bond ratings and bond issues from 1995-1998 for firms that are 
named as potentially responsible parties at EPA Superfund sites (357 firm-years).  They 
collect these firms‟ environmental liability accruals as reported in their 10-Ks.  They also 
collect the publicly available EPA Superfund site data, using four different measures of 
the expected clean-up costs.  One is the number of times the EPA names a firm as a PRP 
(scaled by total assets), the other three are specific measures of the expected site clean-up 
costs.   These are used in various models to test hypotheses as to whether they 
significantly affect bond rating and bond yield.  The results suggest that bond rating and 
bond yield are affected by the number of times firms are named as a potentially 
responsible party at a Superfund site.  They find weaker evidence using the specific 
monetary amounts reported by the EPA for Superfund clean-up costs.  This is similar to 
the Barth and McNichols (1994) study on equity value, where the most significant proxy 
for Superfund site related environmental liabilities is also the number of times a firm is 




Graham and Maher (2006) find that when they include bond rating as an independent 
variable in their bond yield equation, it subsumes the significance of all of their 
environmental liability proxies.  Evidence that bond rating would reflect unreported 
environmental liabilities can be found in the Standard and Poor‟s Corporate Rating 
Criteria (2006).  Standard and Poor‟s states that it assesses a firm‟s environmental 
liabilities as they relate to accounting quality, asset specific values, liquidity, flexibility 
and asset retirement obligations (Standard and Poor‟s, 2006: pp. 24, 32, 33, 51, 67, 113 
and 126) when establishing a firm‟s credit rating.  Thus, any modelling of a firm‟s cost of 
debt as a function of environmental liabilities or performance should be done with the 
expectation that environmental liabilities and performance will be taken into account by 
the bond rating agencies. 
 
This study is similar to that of Graham and Maher (2006) in that it uses measures of a 
firm‟s cost of debt as a dependent variable and EPA reported environmental data as an 
independent variable of interest.  However, it differs significantly in that the independent 
variable of interest in this study is a measure of current environmental performance; 
whereas, Graham and Maher are using a proxy for environmental liabilities as they relate 
to Superfund sites.  Typically, by the time a firm is named as a potentially responsible 
party at a Superfund site, many years have passed from the time of the polluting 
activities.  It is the same distinction between the variables of interest from Barth and 
McNichols (1994) and Clarkson, Li and Richardson (2004).  The potential exists that 
there is some overlap in these measures and thus, some redundancy in the studies.  
17 
 
However, the lag between current environmental performance and being named a 
potentially responsible party is long.  Thus, these are separate and distinct measures with 
separate and distinct implications for the firms studied. 
 
3.3 Environmental liabilities and the cost of capital 
Sharfman and Fernando (2008) theorise that improved environmental risk management 
represents a lower risk strategy and that this lower risk should be reflected in cheaper 
equity, cheaper debt and higher leverage.  Sharfman and Fernando start with a set of TRI 
based quantitative information acquired from the Investor Responsibility Research Center 
(IRRC).  The IRRC collects and aggregates a number of items from the TRI database for 
S&P 500 firms, and then scales them by domestic sales.  Sharfman and Fernando 
specifically collect total TRI emissions, total TRI emissions treated on site and total TRI 
re-used or recycled to create on-site energy (all scaled by domestic sales).  These 
measures are then scaled by the IRRC report of total waste generated by the firm, 
including TRI emissions (scaled by U.S. sales).  As both measures are scaled by domestic 
sales, domestic sales cancels out resulting in the various TRI measures being scaled by 
total waste generated (including TRI).  These are meant to be measures of a firm‟s 
environmental risk management.   
 
For a qualitative measure of environmental risk management, Sharfman and Fernando 
look to the Kinder, Lydenberg, Domini & Co. (KLD) social performance dataset.  KLD is 
a social investment screening firm that provides environmental and social screening of 
the S&P 500 companies for its clients.  KLD measure firms‟ strengths and weaknesses 
18 
 
with regards to a broad range of environmental and social criteria.  Sharfman and 
Fernando use the ratings of environmental strengths and environmental weaknesses as 
two separate measures.  As a final step to develop a measure of environmental risk 
management, a factor analysis is done using all of the TRI measures and the two KLD 
measures.  Sharfman and Fernando end up with a single variable using factor weightings 
on total TRI emissions as a percentage of waste generated, total TRI treated on-site for 
toxicity as a percentage of waste generated and the KLD environmental strengths 
measure.  The sample is based on the S&P 500 and is ultimately limited to 267 firms, due 
to data limitations.  These 267 firms represent 39 different two-digit SIC code groupings.   
 
Firms and industries that systematically generate more waste and less TRI are considered 
to be doing a worse job of environmental risk management.  The higher the TRI numbers 
used as a percent of total waste generated, the better the firm‟s rating for environmental 
risk management.  If a firm were to lower its TRI emissions, but not correspondingly 
lower its other waste generated, the firm would be characterised as having worse 
environmental risk management.  Conversely, a firm that increases its TRI emissions, 
while keeping all other waste generated constant, would be classified as a better manager 
of environmental risk. 
 
Sharfman and Fernando establish models in which they use measures of cost of debt, cost 
of equity, weighted average cost of capital (WACC) and leverage as dependent variables, 
with their environmental risk management construct as the independent variable of 
interest.  They rely on the Bloomberg Financial dataset for much of their cost of capital 
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estimation, acquired directly from Bloomberg in March of 2004.  They base their 
measure of cost of debt on Bloomberg‟s estimates of firm-specific marginal cost of 
borrowing.  However, Sharfman and Fernando do not clearly describe how Bloomberg 
calculates this cost or at what point in time during their sample year (2002) it is 
calculated.  The cost of equity is based on the capital asset pricing model (Sharpe, 1964; 
Lintner, 1965).  The risk-free rate used in their analysis is based on a 10-year U.S. 
treasury bond, measured at the beginning of their sample year.  Three measures of 
WACC are calculated.   The first uses firm Beta from Compustat and a risk premium 
based on Fama and French (2002).  The second is Bloomberg‟s firm-specific calculation 
of WACC and the third uses the Compustat Beta and Bloomberg‟s firm specific risk 
premium.   They call these WACC-1, 2 and 3 respectively.  A factor analysis is then used 
to create a weighting of the three, which they call WACC-4.  All of their analyses are 
then run using only WACC-1 and WACC-4.   When leverage is used as the dependent 
variable, it is calculated as long-term debt reported by Compustat, scaled by market 
capitalisation.   
 
With regards to control variables, leverage is used in all models, except when it is the 
dependent variable.  Size is controlled for using total market capitalisation.  Industry is 
controlled for by using one indicator variable.  Of the thirty-nine SIC codes represented 
in their sample, Sharfman and Fernando performed an analysis determining that six of the 
SIC codes represented were heterogeneous and that the remaining thirty-three represented 
a homogeneous grouping.  The indicator variable was then used to identify firms from the 
heterogeneous grouping.  Sharfman and Fernando explicitly state that this effectively 
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parses out any inter-industry differences that might exist among their sample firms 
(Sharfman and Fernando; 2008, p. 579).  Further control variables are leverage and 
market capitalisation.  The results of Sharfman and Fernando indicate that firms with 
better environmental risk management have a lower WACC, lower cost of equity and 
higher leverage.  However, they find the opposite results for cost of debt.  Their model 
indicates that the worse a firm is at managing environmental risk, the lower its cost of 
debt.   
 
There are a number of reasons to explore these results further.  First, the measure of 
environmental management is one which includes two main measures that will result in 
firms that increase their release and use of toxic chemical being labelled as better 
environmental managers.  The second is the single indicator variable used as a control for 
industry effects.  With thirty-nine different industries in the sample of 267 firms, parsing 
out industry differences with a single indicator variable may not be adequate.  Last, no 
control variables for things such as volatility and profitability are included in the model.  
In the study presented herein, the focus is on a single industry.  This will control for 
significant inter-industry differences in capital structure, TRI and total waste generated.  I 
also use control variables that reflect volatility and profitability, among others.  The 
results of Sharfman and Fernando indicate that firms with higher TRI as a percentage of 
total waste have a higher cost of debt capital.  These results are not necessarily 
inconsistent with the theory and results to be presented herein. 




A final theoretical point suggesting a link between environmental performance and the 
cost of debt capital can be found in agency theory.  Agency theory, as per Jensen and 
Meckling (1976), dictates that it is optimal for bondholders to put restrictions on owner-
managers so that they cannot take risks that will shift wealth from bondholders to 
shareholders.  In polluting industries, environmentally proactive firms are working to 
address their future environmental liabilities on a timely basis; whereas, other firms are 
deferring this cost and will ultimately either shut down their higher polluting operations 
or face compliance costs that have no future economic benefit.  Thus, an ex ante decision 
by management to take a proactive environmental strategy should be one that the debt 
market looks upon favourably.  The firm‟s managers have given up the option to pollute, 
a higher risk strategy that might benefit shareholders, in favour of a lower polluting 
strategy that will help to secure the interests of bondholders.   
 
3.5 Hypotheses 
Based on the previous discussion, I advance the following two hypotheses, in alternate 
form:  
H1: Firms in the pulp and paper industry with relatively superior environmental 
performance will have a higher bond rating; ceteris paribus. 
 
H2: Firms in the pulp and paper industry with relatively superior environmental 
performance will have a lower cost of debt; ceteris paribus. 
 
 
H1 is somewhat redundant after H2 has been explored.  However, there are two important 
subtleties.  The first is to test the expectation that the rating agencies include 
environmental performance in their bond ratings of polluting firms.  The second is to pre-
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determine whether bond rating can be used as a control variable in a model that also 
includes environmental performance.  A number of papers exploring the determinants of 
firms‟ cost of debt include bond rating as a control variable, only to find that it subsumes 
the variable of interest.  A case in point is Graham and Maher (2006), as discussed 
previously herein.  Thus, the results of H1 will support the assertion that a model using 
cost of debt as a dependent variable cannot include bond rating as a control variable, 
without first addressing the relation between environmental performance and bond rating.  
H2 addresses the main objective of this paper, which is to directly explore the relation 





4 Model Development 
4.1 Bond rating 
 
To use bond rating as a dependent variable, I convert firms‟ bond ratings into an ordinal 
scale.  This is necessary in all cases where bond rating is used as a model variable, with 
the methodology of the conversion being the only difference.  For example, Ortiz-Molina 
(2006) uses a scale of one to six, whereas Vasvari (2006) uses a scale of one to twenty-
two.  I use the finer partition based on the twenty-two point scale, so that the model can 
pick up changes within a particular letter rating, such as BBB to BBB+.  For ease of 
comparison and for simplicity, I use the S&P bond rating.  If it is not available prior to 
the bond trade used in the sample, I use the equivalent Moody‟s or Fitch rating.  Thus, an 
S&P rating of AAA+ is coded as „1‟, AAA as „2‟, AAA– as „3‟, and so on.  Using this 
coding, a lower number represents a better bond rating. 
 
4.2 Firm specific cost of debt 
 
To establish a firm specific cost of debt, so as to test H2, it is necessary to have an 
observable transaction.  Trading in corporate debt has been an over-the-counter, opaque 
market for most of the twentieth century and observable transactions have historically not 
been readily available.
7
  Thus, access to data has been a limitation when measuring a 
firm‟s cost of debt.  One approach is to use new issues of corporate debt only.  For 
example: Vasvari (2006) uses the floating rate on new, syndicated loans, and Ortiz-
Molina (2006) uses the at-issue yield spread on new, fixed rate corporate bonds.  Both 
papers explore aspects of the interaction of managerial incentives and a firm‟s cost of 
                                                 
7
 For a historical overview of the bond market microstructure see Biais and Green (2005).  For a discussion 
of recent changes in transparency, see Edwards (2006). 
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debt.  Graham and Maher (2006) also restrict their sample to firms issuing new debt.  The 
drawback of using new debt issues to measure a firm‟s cost of debt is that it restricts the 
sample to firms issuing debt in a given year.  This can lead to a sample selection bias, as 
debt issuing firms may exhibit systematically different characteristics from those that do 
not issue debt in a given year.  Regardless of this potential bias, when focusing on a 
single industry, restricting the sample to new issuers is not feasible due to the limited 
sample size.   
 
To capture a larger data set, Campbell and Taksler (2003) use bond trades as reported by 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners (NAIC).  The NAIC data includes 
bond trades by life insurance companies, property and casualty insurance companies, and 
health maintenance organisations.  This allowed Campbell and Taksler to collect panel 
data to explore the interaction of equity volatility and corporate bond yield.  The sample 
period over which Campbell and Taksler draw their data is 1995 to 1999.  Over this same 
period, increased calls were made for more transparency in the debt market.
8
  As a result, 
the Trade Reporting and Compliance Engine (TRACE) was established.  It was phased in 
beginning in June 2002, and was in full implementation by the end of 2005.  TRACE 
now reports virtually all over-the-counter trades, with the exception of private placements 
issued under rule 144A.
9
  Thus, using data from the Mergent Fixed Income Securities 
Database (which reports NAIC trades), along with TRACE, the market prices for a large 
cross section of firms‟ bond trades is available.  I use this data to calculate the cost of 
debt for firms in the pulp and paper industry.  This blended approach creates a set of 
                                                 
8
 Edwards 2006, p. 33. 
9
 Rule 144: Selling Restricted and Controlled Securities.  Rule 144A identifies what sales produce 
restricted securities.  For more detail see: http://www.sec.gov/investor/pubs/rule144.htm 
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panel data for U.S. pulp and paper firms with outstanding debt from 1994 through 2005.  
Only one bond trade per firm-year is used.  The set of panel data is unbalanced as a result 
of mergers and acquisitions, and a few firms that do not have outstanding debt at the 
beginning of the sample period. 
 
To control for changes in the market-wide cost of debt over time, I use the yield spread as 
a measure of firms‟ cost of debt.  The yield spread is defined as the difference between 
the yield to maturity of a corporate bond, or note, and that of a government bond of 
similar maturity.  For new issues, the Mergent Fixed Income Securities Database reports 
the yield spread; however, when using after-issue trade data from Mergent or TRACE, 
several calculations must be made.  TRACE reports the yield to maturity of its bond 
trades.  Thus, an appropriate government bond must be used to calculate the bond‟s yield 
spread.  The U.S. Federal Reserve reports the yield on 1, 2, 5, 7, 10 and 20 year treasury 
bonds of constant maturity for the sample period of 1995 to 2006.  It also reports 30 year 
yields covering January 1, 1995 to February 18, 2003; recommencing February 9, 2006.  
In the cases where the time to maturity is greater than 20 years and the bond transaction 
takes place between February 18, 2003 and February 9, 2006; a twenty year treasury 
bond is used as the benchmark.  In the cases where the time to maturity falls between two 
of the benchmark treasury bonds, I use interpolation to apply an appropriate weighting of 





For the NAIC trades, the yield to maturity must be calculated by equating the cash 
outflow to the discounted value of the future cash inflows.  This is done by finding the 
discount rate that makes the present value of the par value of the bond plus the present 
value of the remaining coupon payments equal to the cash outflow on the date of the 
bond transaction.  The following equation is used to do this: 
Cash Outflowt = Par Value/(1+r)
T
 + ∑Coupon Payment/(1+r)
T-i
   (1) 
Where, in the case of semi-annual Coupon payments:  
T = 2*(Years to maturity) 
i = 0, 1, 2, ….; for all T-i > 0.   
Cash Outflow = Actual price paid for the bond (flat price) plus cash paid for accrued 
interest from last coupon date to the transaction date; based on a 
$100 par value 
 
Par Value = $100.00 
 
Coupon Payment = stated value of semi-annual bond coupon 
 
r = the effective interest rate satisfying the stated equality, solved for iteratively 
Once the yield to maturity is calculated, the yield spread can be calculated in the same 
manner as it is for the TRACE transactions.   
 
For each sample firm, a bond transaction is selected that takes place closest to, but after, 
the three months following the firm‟s fiscal year end date.  This allows adequate time for 
the release of the previous year‟s financial results.  Only one bond trade per firm-year is 
used.  Using this approach, the yield spreads for the sample are calculated based on 
NAIC transactions for 1995 through 2004.  For 2005 and 2006, the TRACE transactions 
are primarily used.  As convertible bonds have an embedded equity component, 
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convertible bonds are not used in the sample.  None of the bonds in the sample are 
putable or have a sinking fund provision and almost all are senior debt.  
 
4.3 Proxy for environmental liabilities 
 
In 1987, the EPA began collecting and reporting national data on the release of toxic 
chemicals, which is known as the Toxic Release Inventory (TRI).  The TRI reports the 
amount of toxic chemicals released to land, air and water for all facilities operating in the 
United States.  Since this data became available, a number of academic studies have used 
the TRI as a proxy for environmental performance (e.g. Klassen and Whybark, 1999; 
Klassen, 2001; King and Lennox, 2001; Clarkson, Li and Richardson 2004; Clarkson et 
al., 2006).  In keeping with these studies, I use the TRI as a proxy for environmental 
performance.   
 
Other papers using different versions of TRI based measures include Al-Tuwaijri, 
Christensen and Hughes (2004) and Sharfman and Fernando (2006).  These two papers 
use a sample of S&P 500 firms, thus industry differences are important.  Al-Tuwaijri, 
Christensen and Hughes control this by using the total TRI in the denominator of their 
proxy and TRI recycled as their numerator.  Thus, they are measuring what percentage of 
total TRI is recycled by each firm in their sample.  As inter-industry control is important 
when using an S&P 500 sample, this method works to control for inter-industry 
differences.  I explored using this method for the pulp and paper industry; however, the 
numerator (TRI recycled) is typically at or near zero for the entire sample.  Turning to 
Sharfman and Fernando (2006), they scale their TRI measures by total waste generated.  
28 
 
Again, this scaling is meant to provide comparability across industries.  Sharfman and 
Fernando argue that the higher the percentage of TRI as a function of total waste, the 
better the firm is at managing environmental risk.  I do not use this measure as I want to 




Clarkson, Li and Richardson (2004) scale total firm TRI by cost of goods sold.  The 
objective of scaling is to create a measure that reflects each firm‟s toxic release per unit 
of production in each given year.  However, scaling by cost of goods sold includes costs 
related to foreign operations.  The TRI only reflects domestic U.S. operations.  The more 
internationally diversified a firm is, the larger the denominator when scaling, and the 
lower its relative measure of TRI.  This may lead to underestimating the amount of 
pollution an internationally diversified firm creates in relation to firms that operate 
primarily in the U.S.  To address this, I scale firms‟ total TRI by U.S. sales (based on 
location of seller), eliminating the possibility that a firm with a higher degree of 
international diversification will have its environmental performance measure biased 
downward. 
 
4.4 Control Variables 
 
The primary reason for focusing on a single industry is to control for the overall 
economic and regulatory factors that are industry-specific.  However, there are still a 
number of intra-industry factors that must be controlled for, while also maintaining as 
many degrees of freedom as possible, due to the restricted sample size.   
                                                 
10




To proxy for a firm‟s overall default risk I use the Altman Z-score (Altman, 1968).  For 
public companies this is: 
Z = 1.2X1 + 1.4X2 + 3.3X3 + 0.6X4 + 1.0X5 
Where (Compustat data items in brackets), 
X1 = Working Capital/Total Assets = (Item 4 - Item 5)/(Item 6) 
X2 = Retained Earnings/Total Assets = (Item 36)/(Item 6) 
X3 = EBIT/Total Assets = (Item 170 + Item 15)/(Item 6) 
X4 = Market Equity/Book Value Liabilities = (Item 199*Item 25)/(Item 5 + Item 9) 
X5 = Sales/Total Assets = (Item 12)/(Item 6) 
 
The Altman Z-score is considered the „tried and tested‟ model for bankruptcy prediction 
(Eidleman, 1995).  It has been shown to be an effective predictor of bankruptcy since it 
has come into use.  Several papers imply the model has not been as effective a predictor 
of bankruptcy in different time-frames and under different economic cycles over the past 
30 years as it was in the period over which it was developed (e.g. Begley et al., 1996; 
Grice and Ingram, 2001).  However, regardless of whether it is an accurate predictor of 
bankruptcy, it is used widely by banks, underwriters and rating agencies to asses a firm‟s 
credit worthiness.  It also captures many of the underlying control variables that are used 
to model firm-specific cost of debt.  The model is meant to represent: liquidity (X1), 
profitability (X2), productivity (X3), market value (X4) and asset-turnover (X5).  Altman 
(2003, p. 8) notes that X5 is of particular concern as asset-turnover can vary from industry 
to industry.  Thus, using the Z-score as a proxy for default risk is more applicable in a 
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single industry setting, where inter-industry differences in asset turnover are not a 
concern.  Some examples of Z-score being used as a control variable can be found in the 
finance literature (e.g. Mackie-Mason, 1990; Lemmon et al., 2006).  Higher values for 
each individual measure used in the Z-score reflect lower default risk.  I expect that this 
will cause the coefficient on Z-score to be negative. 
 
Campbell and Taksler (2003) study the increasing spread between U.S. Corporate bonds 
and U.S. Treasury bonds.  This spread increases in the latter half of the 1990s.  Campbell 
and Taksler find evidence that this is due to increased firm volatility.  The same result is 
found by Mansi, Maxwell and Miller (2006).  I am concerned about capturing firm 
volatility, given its demonstrated effect on yield spread.  Thus, I include the annualised 
standard deviation of firms‟ mean returns for the year prior to the bond trade as a measure 
of firm-specific volatility.  I expect that as volatility increases, yield spread will increase.  
To be consistent with this expectation, I also include volatility when using bond rating as 
a measure of firm specific cost of debt.  If higher volatility results in a higher yield 
spread, it follows that it should affect bond rating.  As the ordinal transformation of bond 
rating used herein increases as bond rating decreases, the predicted sign for the 
coefficient on volatility is positive for both yield spread and bond rating. 
 
The resulting model to test H1 is: 
Bond Ratingit = α0 + α1TRI/US Salesit + α2Z-Scoreit + α3Volatilityit + εit (2) 




To test H2, I use equation (2) as a starting point, replacing bond rating with yield spread 
and adding several more control variables that have been shown to affect a firm‟s yield 
spread.  The first additional variable is derived from equation (2).  As implied by H1, I 
expect that bond rating will take into account a firm‟s environmental performance and 
that using it as a control variable, when yield spread is the dependent variable, will 
subsume the power of the test variable (environmental performance).  However, using 
bond rating as a control variable to test H2 would serve to capture many firm specific 
characteristics that might not be picked up in other model variables.  To facilitate the use 
of bond rating as a control variable, I follow the methodology used by Datta, Iskandar-
Datta and Patel (1999), as well as a number of subsequent papers using yield spread as a 
dependent variable (i.e. Anderson, Mansi and Reeb, 2003; Klock, Mansi and Maxwell, 
2005; Ortiz-Molina, 2006).   This approach imposes an orthogonal condition on bond 
rating by first regressing bond rating onto the variable of interest. The residual is then 
used as a measure of bond rating, incremental to the information content of the test 
variable already in the regression.  Thus, a control variable that addresses bond raters‟ 
opinions as to the credit worthiness of each bond can be used, in the presence of other 
control variables that also act as determinants of the bond raters‟ opinions.  Using this 
approach, I create a „modified bond rating‟ as follows:  
 
Bond ratingit = α1 + α0 + α1TRI/US Salesit + εit     
  
 




The only drawback is that equation (3) may be under-specified and that α2 may be biased 
due to an omitted control variable.  Thus, I also include Z-score and volatility in this first 
stage regression.  The equation for the modified bond rating is equation (2), saving the 
residual as the modified bond rating: 
 
Bond Ratingit = α0 + α1TRI/US Salesit + α2Z-Scoreit + α3Volatilityit + εit  
Modified bond ratingit = εit       (2a) 
 
As the modified bond rating will have a mean of zero, with ratings below zero reflecting 
a better bond rating, I expect that the parameter estimate will be positive. 
 
A measure that is not incorporated into bond rating is time to maturity.  For each 
individual firm, I expect that the yield spread will increase as the time to maturity 
increases.  However, when comparing the yield spreads of different firms, bonds of 
longer duration may be associated with stronger firms and thus with lower yield spreads.  
A lower yield spread for longer maturity bonds may also be due to the fact that my 
sample period covers a number of years (around 2000 to 2003) in which it was common 
to see an inverted yield curve.  With regards to bond rating, I expect that stronger firms 
will have access to longer term debt.  However, as my selection of bonds is based on the 
closest trade to a specific point in time, the sample bonds are not necessarily a reflection 
of the average time to maturity of a firm‟s bonds.  A final point with regards to maturity 
is the possibility that firms that are under-performing may have higher yields on longer 
maturity bonds, as bond holders might have a more positive outlook on the weaker firms 
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long-term prospects.  Thus, I make no directional predictions as to the relation between 
time to maturity and yield spread.   
 
As noted previously herein, Campbell and Taksler (2003) attribute much of the increase 
in the average spread of corporate bonds over treasury bonds in the late 1990s to 
increased stock market volatility.  However, liquidity has also been shown to be a major 
factor in pricing corporate bonds relative to treasury bonds (i.e. Chen et al., 2007).  To 
address this, I include the spread between the average Moody‟s Aaa corporate bond yield 
and the ten-year treasury bond yield on the day of the bond trade I use in my sample.  In 
periods of tighter liquidity, the treasury spread of average bond yields tend to increase to 
compensate.  Thus, I expect the yield spread of the sample bonds to increase as the spread 
between the average corporate and Treasury bond increases.  
 
The resulting model to test H2 is: 
Yield Spreadit =   α0 + α1TRI/US Salesit + α2 Modified Bond Ratingit + α3Z-Scoreit  
 
+ α4Volatilityit + α5Maturityit + α6AaaSpreadit +  εit   (4) 
The predicted signs are α1 > 0, α2 > 0, α3 < 0, α4 > 0, α5 = ?, and α6 > 0. 
 
With a minimum of variables, the models control for firm-specific default risk.  Using 
yield spread also controls for changes in the risk-free interest rate over the time-series of 
the sample.  Keeping the number of parameters to a minimum allows for more power in 




5 Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
 
Clarkson, Li and Richardson (2004) identify forty-four firms that operate pulp and paper 
mills in the United States.  They identify fifteen firms for which the pulp and paper 
operations are not a major part of operations.  After eliminating these firms, they are left 
with twenty-nine firms that have significant operations in the pulp and paper industry.  
Their sample period goes from 1989 to 2000 and includes 256 firm-year observations of 
unbalanced panel data.  This provides a reasonable benchmark as to the number of firms 
and firm-year observations I collect.   
 
The sample period of this study differs from that of Clarkson, Li and Richardson  (2004), 
as it is more recent and covers more closely the years in which the cluster rules come into 
effect.  The fiscal years over which the sample is gathered are from 1994 to 2005 (12 
years).  The sample firms‟ bond trades, from which the annual costs of debt are 
calculated, are the bond trade closest to, but after, the three months following fiscal year-
end.
11
  Typically, this is on or after April 1
st
, as most firms have a December year-end.  
Only one bond trade is used per firm-year.  All of the control variables, except for 
volatility, are measured at fiscal year-end.  Volatility is based on the calendar year prior 
to the date of the bond trade.      
 
The starting point for creating a list of sample firms is the U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency‟s Toxic Release Inventory database.
12
  Preliminary data for each year is publicly 
available in the September following the end of each reporting year on a facility by 
                                                 
11
 In three instances this restriction is violated and a trade within the three months after fiscal year-end is 







  A complete report is released in the following March, covering the 
calendar year two years previous.  This data can be accessed on an industry by industry 
basis, my focus being SIC 26, Paper and Allied Products.  In this study, I match the TRI 
from a given sample year to all other variables from the same year.  This means that the 
actual TRI data is not publicly released and I am making the assumption that relative 
environmental performance is recognised prior to the TRI data being officially released.  
Any positive results imply that bond holders and raters are close enough to the ongoing 
activities of a firm so as to assess whether the firm has technology in place so as to 
release less toxic chemicals and that it is making capital expenditures that will reduce 
these releases.  The matching of TRI to the same fiscal year in which it occurs follows the 
methodology of Clarkson, Li and Richardson (2004).  Clarkson, Li and Richardson also 
look at a one-year lag variable for TRI as a sensitivity analysis.  This will also be 
addressed in the sensitivity analysis presented herein.   
 
Within SIC 26, approximately five to six hundred facilities per year reported their 
releases of toxic chemicals to the EPA for a total of 6,443 facility reports over the twelve 
year time-series.  Facility name, address, city, county, state, zip code, latitude, longitude 
and two EPA designated identification numbers are given for each facility.  The facility 
name may, or may not, be indicative of the corporate ownership of the facility.  Based on 
the facility names and some preliminary web searching, I identify forty-five distinct firms 
and aggregate individual facilities to these firms.  These forty-five firms represent 84% of 
the toxic chemicals released by firms in SIC 26 as reported to the EPA from 1994 to 
                                                 
13
 Firms must report their facility data to the EPA by the beginning of July each year. 
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2005.  Many of the facilities that are not assigned to a firm are owned by firms in the 
packaging and laminating business and not directly related to the pulp and paper sector.   
 
At this point it is important to account for the way in which the EPA handles its TRI data 
on a time-series basis.  If a facility is acquired by another firm, the entire time-series for 
the facility is transferred to the acquiring firm.  For example, Domtar Inc. is not a major 
pulp and paper firm in the United States until it purchases four large facilities in 2001 
from Georgia Pacific.  However, the current data for these four facilities attributes the 
entire time-series of the annual TRI data to Domtar.  If I do not address this, I will 
attribute the TRI of these facilities to Domtar from 1994-2005, when they should be 
attributed to Domtar from 2001-2005 and to Georgia-Pacific previous to that.  This is 
also the case for mergers.  For example, Mead Corp and Westvaco merge in 2002 to 
become Mead Westvaco.  After the merger, the EPA data reports the facilities under the 
Mead Westvaco facility names.  For the period 1994-2001, each of the Mead Westvaco 
facilities must be attributed to Mead or Westvaco on a facility by facility basis.  
Furthermore, all of these facilities must be tracked back in time to establish whether they 
were acquired from other companies between 1994 and 2001.  This process must be done 
for all firms from the original forty-five identified firms, across the more than five 
hundred facilities reported each year, over the twelve year time-series.   
 
To do this, I first look to the firms‟ lists of properties as described in Part II of each 10-K 
(„Properties‟).
14
  The detail given by each firm differs greatly.  Some firms identify each 
                                                 
14
 For Canadian companies, annual reports are sourced from Sedar and for other non-U.S. firms annual 
reports are sourced from company websites. 
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of their production facilities by city and state, some only give the number of facilities per 
state and some give almost no information.  In many cases, a review of Part I of the 10-K 
(„Business‟) will reveal information about facilities.  Alternatively, the MD&A might 
also discuss facilities.  The notes to the financial statements also cover acquisitions and 
disposals.  As a last resort, a web search using the facility name and related firm will 
often result in information on the disposal or acquisition of a particular facility.   
 
The result of this search, and re-assigning facilities to their appropriate corporate owner 
over the twelve year time-series, increases the number of specifically identified firms to 
seventy-one, representing eighty-nine percent of the Toxic Release Inventory for the 
sample period.  This is indicative of the rationalisation in the pulp and paper industry that 
has occurred over the past decade or so.  A good example is International Paper.  Based 
on the 2005 EPA TRI data, International Paper released 50.6 million pounds of toxic 
chemicals in 1994.  However, since 1994, International Paper acquired four major firms 
within the pulp and paper industry.  Attributing the relevant facilities to these four firms 
reduces International Paper‟s 1994 TRI to 30.1 million.  Over the sample period, as 
International Paper makes various acquisitions (and some disposals), its TRI increases to 
57.5 million pounds in 2005.  The described methodology of tracking facilities over the 
sample period and re-assigning them appropriately will certainly include a number of 
errors; however, these errors will create much less noise than not tracking facility 




At this point, a number of firms that are clearly not predominantly in the pulp and paper 
industry are dropped as sample candidates.  These are firms such as Proctor and Gamble 
and 3M.   This reduces the number of firms to sixty-five and pulls two percent from the 
total TRI.  The required control variables are not available for seventeen firms, as they 
are privately held.  Despite the fact that this represents a relatively large number of firms, 
they account for only seven percent of the total TRI.  A further three small firms that are 
taken over early in the time-series are eliminated.  Foreign firms that operate primarily 
outside the U.S. are also removed from the sample, removing nine firms and five percent 
of the TRI.   This leaves thirty-six firms representing seventy-five percent of the EPA 
reported TRI over the twelve year time-series.  Merged with the bond trades and control 
data, the sample includes twenty-six firms and 205 firm-year observations.   
 
The reduction in firms is primarily attributable to firms that do not have available bond 
trade data.  However, they represent a relatively small amount of the TRI releases over 
the sample period.  Another firm-year is ultimately eliminated as an outlier based on an 
OLS regression and a Cook‟s D of 1.137.  This observation is from a firm that is clearly 
approaching bankruptcy, as the yield spread for the outlying firm-year is over 1,200 basis 
points.  Less extreme outliers are addressed as part of the sensitivity analyses presented in 
section 7.  Thus, the final sample is twenty-six firms and 204 firm-year observation 
representing sixty-four percent of the total TRI emissions of SIC 26 from 1994 through 
2005.  This sample size is comparable to that of Clarkson, Li and Richardson (2004), 
particularly given that their sample covers a number of years prior to mine and the 




Table 1 presents the sample descriptive statistics.  Yield spread, total TRI and time to 
maturity indicate a positively skewed distribution.  For yield spread, this is due to more 
clustering at the lower end, with the higher yield spreads being more spread out.  Total 
TRI is affected by a few very large firms creating a large proportion of the total industry 
TRI.  For instance, in 2005 International Paper released 57.5 million pounds of toxic 
chemicals, compared to the median of 4.6 million pounds.   Time to maturity is affected 
by a number of bonds in the twenty to thirty year range and tighter clustering around the 
seven to ten year range.  The other variables exhibit minimal skewness, with a relatively 
small difference between mean and median.   
 
Table 2 presents the Pearson correlations for the sample (Spearman correlations are 
similar and unreported).  Bond rating is also presented for comparison to modified bond 
rating.  The correlations between yield spread and the independent variables in equation 
(4) are as predicted by the theory and hypotheses discussed previously herein.  The 
orthogonal condition placed between bond rating and the three variables; TRI/US Sales, 





6.1 Econometric approach 
 
As the data used for this analysis is both time-series and cross-sectional (panel data), I 
expect that if standard OLS is used, the error term will be a compound one that includes 
the usual error term as well as fixed and random effects reflecting firm and year specific 
characteristics that are not sufficiently captured in the model.  These specific 
characteristics may be material with regards to environmental performance.  I will take a 
number of approaches to estimate the model parameters and deal with the error terms 
from which to make inferences.  The main approach uses clustered standard errors 
(Huber, 1967; Rogers, 1993; Petersen, 2008a, 2008b) based on firm and controls for 
fixed year effects with a set of year-specific indicator variables.  Clustered standard errors 
are also known as Rogers standard errors and are White (1984) standard errors corrected 
for within cluster correlation.  The parameter estimates will be identical to OLS, but the 
standard errors will be larger.  Clustering by firm is described as one-dimensional 
clustering in Petersen (2008a, 2008b).  As the pulp and paper industry has gone through 
significant changes over the twelve year time-series, the year-specific indicator should 
address this second dimension of correlation.  This is one of the methods suggested by 
Petersen (2008b) as a way to deal with two cross-sections of correlated error-terms.  In 
the panel data setting used, this is a relatively conservative approach to making 
inferences.  Other approaches are also presented for comparison; including OLS, two-
way fixed-effects, random effects (FGLS), between group estimation, Fama-MacBeth 
and annual regression methods.    
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6.2 Bond rating as dependent variable 
I follow the method as described above to run equation (2), clustering by firm to address 
correlation in the residuals due to re-sampling the same firms over a number of years and 
using year-specific indicators to address year-specific fixed effects.  The resulting 
parameter estimates and related statistics are presented in table 3, panel A.  The 
parameter estimate for environmental performance is significant (p-value = 0.0373, one-
tailed) and large enough to be economically relevant.  It indicates that the market assesses 
a rating change of 0.30 for each pound of toxic chemicals released per $1,000 U.S. sales, 
based on the 22 point bond scale used.  The results for Z-score and volatility also indicate 
they affect bond rating as predicted in Equation (2).  The parameter estimate for Z-score 
is negative 1.25 and significant at the 1% level.  The impact of volatility is also 
significant at the 1% level and similar in economic relevance.   
 
To present another method of estimation meant to address panel data situations, I take a 
two-way fixed effects approach.  This approach simply includes a set of firm and year 
indicators.  This takes up a number of degrees of freedom and will greatly increase the R-
squared of the model (as is expected when 25 firm and 11 year indicators enter the 
model).  Table 3; panel B, presents the results of running equation (2) in this way.  An F-
test indicates that fixed effects are present.  The parameter estimate for the environmental 
performance variable is again statistically and economically significant.  However, the 
parameter is lower, at a rating change of 0.23 for each pound of toxic release per $1,000 
of U.S. Sales.  This might be a result of the lower power of the regression with the added 
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independent variables.  The R-squared, at ninety-five percent, is much larger, as 
predicted.   
 
Taking into account firm and year effects results in marginal significance for Z-score, 
with a parameter of just -0.14 compared to -1.25 when using a clustering approach and a 
p-value of 0.0991.  The Z-score variable is meant to capture firm-specific characteristics.  
Thus, it is not surprising that Z-score becomes marginal in a model that includes firm 
indicator variables.  Volatility is significant at the greater than 1% level; however, its 
magnitude is reduced to 3.28 compared to 22.28 when clustering by firm.  As volatility is 
included in the model partly to address the systematic time-series changes in volatility 
documented by Campbell and Taksler (2003), this result is also plausible.   
 
To clearly demonstrate how clustering is a method of efficiency gain, I also run equation 
(2) using standard OLS regression, except that I continue to control for fixed year effects 
with the set of year-specific indicators.  Table 3; panel C, presents the OLS results, with 
year fixed effects.  The parameters of panel C are identical to panel A.  However, the 
significance levels are much higher when the standard errors are not corrected for 
correlation in the residuals.  This clearly shows that the main approach, based on 
clustered (or Rogers) standard errors is a more conservative approach and results in more 
reliable inferences. 
 
For another approach to estimation I look to Clarkson, Li and Richardson (2004).  They 
use an estimated GLS approach as their main technique in addressing their sample of 
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unbalanced panel data.  Taking the same approach with this sample provides results that 
are consistent with those already presented.  However, based on a Hausman Test 
(Hausman [1978]), the random effects a GLS approach is meant to address are highly 
correlated with the regressors.  This indicates that an estimated GLS should not be used 
for equation (3) as it yields biased and inconsistent parameter estimates. 
 
The overall results of table 3 provide strong evidence that a firm‟s bond rating is affected 
by environmental performance, supporting H1.  With the results of estimating equation 
(2) in hand, I move on to the main hypothesis, modelled in equation (4).  
 
6.3 Yield spread as dependent variable 
Using the same approach as with the bond rating model, I start by running equation (4) 
clustering by firm to address within firm correlation in the residuals and year-specific 
indicators to pick up year fixed effects.  The results presented in table 4; panel A, reject 
the null hypothesis of no association between environmental performance and yield 
spread at conventional levels.  This supports the prediction of H2.  The parameter 
estimate implies a 17.13 basis point „environmental risk‟ premium for each pound of TRI 
per $1,000 of U.S. sales.  All of the other variables behave as expected.  Z-Score and 
volatility are incrementally significant to the modified bond rating, which is consistent 
with the orthogonal condition imposed to create the modified bond rating.  It is 
interesting to note that the bond rating variable and volatility are similar in their affect on 
yield spread.  This is remarkably consistent with the findings of Campbell and Taksler 
(2003), who also find that volatility explains as much about cross-sectional variations in 
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bond yield as bond rating does.  The usual association between maturity and yield spread 
is significant, indicating that firm and year effects have adequately been controlled.  It is 
interesting to note that the strongest year effects are found in the years 2004 and 2005.  
These two year indicators are positive and significant at the ten percent and five percent 
level, respectively.  This may by indicative of the merger and acquisition activity that 
took place in the industry over the sample period.  By these years, many of the weaker 
firms have dropped out of the sample and in 2005 one of the largest sample firms, 
Georgia Pacific, is taken private. 
 
A Hausman Test indicates that a two-way random effects model is appropriate for this 
setting.  Thus, I use estimated GLS, based on Wansbeek and Kapteyn (1989), as another 
method of testing H2.  Table 4; panel B, presents the results of a two-way random effects 
approach for making inferences based on equation (4).  Again, the results are highly 
significant with a coefficient of 21.20 basis points, or an average „environmental risk‟ 
premium of 46.64 basis points.  The control variables continue to be significant, 
consistent with the discussion presented above.   
 
For comparison purposes, I also run standard OLS with White‟s standard errors.  Table 4; 
panel C, presents the results with year-specific indicator variables.  Again, the under-
stated error-term is evident with the stronger results compared to clustering.  Two-way 




6.4 Time-series average, annual regressions and Fama-MacBeth 
As a way to try and eliminate time-series problems, I take the time-series average of the 
independent and dependent variables for each firm that enters the sample.  I used each 
average as a single observation in a classical OLS regression (a „between-groups‟ 
estimator).  This reduces the sample size from 204 to 26.  This setting will indicate 
whether a better long-term average environmental performance will result in lower 
average yield spreads.  The results are presented in table 5.  Again, the main result holds, 
indicating a yield spread of 31.43 basis points for each pound of toxic chemicals released 
per $1,000 in U.S. sales (p-value = 0.0062).   
 
I also run a series of annual regressions.  The parameter estimates for environmental 
performance in each annual regression are presented in table 6.  In seven of the twelve 
years, the parameter estimate for the environmental performance variable is significant at 
the 10% or greater level.  The years of significance are in two groups, 1995-1998 and 
2003-2005.  In the years between 1998 and 2003 a great deal of consolidation occurred in 
the pulp and paper business.  In those years there is a great deal of noise in the data.  The 
data gathering methodology is such that all of an acquired firm‟s TRI was added to the 
new parent‟s total TRI for the entire year of the acquisition.  This may not have coincided 
perfectly with the attribution of the sales from the acquired company.  This potential 
measurement error works against H2.  With small annual sample sizes, noise that is 
acceptable in a larger sample may show up and result in insignificant estimates for the 




With a set of annual cross-sectional regressions, the next logical approach is to use that of 
Fama and MacBeth (1973).  However, the issue of possible noise in the years with more 
mergers and acquisitions is one to which this method is also sensitive.  The results based 
on Fama and MacBeth (1973) are presented in table 7.  Taking the time-series average of 
the annual parameter estimates for the environmental performance variable results in a 
parameter estimate of 18.10 basis points.  I then use the standard deviation of the annual 
slopes to calculate the t-value for making inferences.  With a standard deviation of 21.38 
basis points, the t-value is less than 1.00, clearly making the estimate statistically 
insignificant.  The years 1999-2002 are very much driving the deviations of the annual 
slopes.   
 
This is consistent with greater noise being in the data those years.  It is also consistent 
with the possibility that the association between environmental performance and yield 
spread is not strong enough to infer that a relation exists.  However, it is interesting to 
note that the variable Aaa spread also becomes insignificant in the Fama-MacBeth 
approach.  As previously described herein, Aaa spread is the difference between a 
Moody‟s rated Aaa bond yield and the yield of a ten year treasury bond.  Like 
environmental performance, the annual slopes show too much variance from year to year, 
which works against finding results using Fama-MacBeth.   
 
The Fama-MacBeth approach should also be adjusted for serial correlation.  For instance, 
in Fama and French (2002), an AR(1) process with a correlation of 0.75 is assumed.  
They take a somewhat informal approach to addressing this by increasing the required t-
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stat by a factor of 2.5.  Thus, the required t-stat for significance at the five percent level is 
approximately 5.00 (two-tailed).  The highest t-stat in the results presented in table 7 is 
the t-stat for modified bond rating, at 1.85.  Thus, any adjustment for serial correlation 





7 Sensitivity analysis 
7.1 Alternate specification 
To address the possibility that equation (4) is not well specified, I look to a setting that 
uses other control variables.  The model presented in equation (4) is used so as to be as 
parsimonious as possible with the specification.  As parsimony is the stated objective, I 
am using a non-nested test, rather than a „kitchen sink‟ approach to test whether equation 
(4) is appropriate.
15
  The alternate model is based on a survey of the literature using the 
cost of debt as a dependent variable.  The papers include: Sengupta (1998), Campbell and 
Taksler (2003), Ortiz-Molina (2006), Vasvari (2006), and Sengupta and Wang (2006).  
The objective is to create an alternate (non-nested) specification that does not include 
bond rating and Z-Score.  This specification is as follows: 
 
Yield Spread =    α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Leverage + α3Coverage +  
 
α4Current + α5Volatility + α6Size + ε     (5) 
 
 
The predicted signs are α1 > 0, α2 > 0, α3 < 0, α4 < 0, α5 > 0 and α6 < 0; where leverage is 
defined as total debt divided by total assets, coverage is defined as earnings before 
interest and taxes divided by interest expense, current is current assets minus current 
liabilities then scaled by total assets (X1 from the Z-score), volatility is as defined 
previously, and size is the total market value of equity.
16
   For reference table 8 presents 
the Pearson correlation matrix for the variables in the main model, equation (4), and those 
                                                 
15
 I also run a model using the „kitchen sink‟ approach with all variables from both equations (4) and (5).  
The main results remain unchanged.   I also run a version of both models including asset newness (total 
assets over undepreciated total assets).  This is meant to control for the possibility that the results are 
simply related to the firms that have most recently made capital expenditures.  The main results remain 
unchanged. 
16
 I also run a regression with the log of the book value of total assets as a measure of size as opposed to 
market value, with similar results. 
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in the alternate model, equation (5).  Leverage, interest coverage, current ratio and size 
are all correlated with bond rating and Z-score as expected.  This supports the use of a 
bond rating variable and Z-score in equation (4) to capture the affects of these variables 
on yield spread.  With regards to yield spread; leverage, interest coverage and size are 
correlated as expected; however, the current ratio is not significantly correlated with yield 
spread. 
 
 Table 9; panel A, presents the regression results for equation (5), based on standard 
errors clustered by firm and using year fixed effects.  The results continue to support the 
hypothesized relationship between environmental performance and the cost of debt.  The 
parameter estimate for the environmental performance variable is 18.99 with a p-value of 
0.004.  Table 9; panel B, presents the results using estimated GLS.  Results are similar. 
 
To establish whether equation (4) or equation (5) is the most appropriate, I apply the 
Davidson and MacKinnon non-nested J test.
17
  I run the following regressions: 
 
Yield Spread =    α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2 Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score  
 
+ α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6AaaSpread +  
 
β1Predicted Value of Eq‟n (5) + ε    (4a) 
 
 
Yield Spread =    α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Leverage + α3Coverage + α4Current  
 
+ α5Volatility + α6Size + β2Predicted Value of Eq‟n (4) + ε  (5a) 
 
 
                                                 
17
 See Greene 2003, p. 155. 
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If β1 = 0 and β2 ≠ 0, then equation (4) is a more appropriate model.  If β1 ≠ 0 and β2 = 0, 
then equation (5) is a more appropriate model.  If a model‟s predicted value provides 
explanatory power when included in a competing model while the competing model‟s 
predicted value does not do the same in reverse, the given model is a better specification.  
In other words, the given model provides all of the explanatory power of the competing 
model, and then some.  The results are presented in table 10.  The regression results are 
such that β1 = 0.323, with p-value 0.1553 and β2 =1.00, with p-value < 0.0001.  Thus, 
based on the Davidson MacKinnon J test, I can conclude that equation (4) is a better 
specification than equation (5). 
 
7.2 Outliers 
As discussed in the sample selection process presented in section 5, one outlier was 
eliminated from all analyses due to an extremely high yield spread of over 1,200 basis 
points and a Cook‟s D of 1.137.  Chen et al. (2003) suggest that the conventional level of 
Cook‟s D is 4/N.  I take two approaches to this.  As Chen at al. (2003) are not discussing 
panel data, my first approach is to calculate the cut-off level based on the number of 
sample firms.  This is consistent with the principle approach of clustering based on firm.  
The resulting cut-off point for each observation-wise statistic is then 4/26 or 0.154.  No 
observation used in the full sample result in a Cook‟s D greater than 0.154 and thus, the 
main results hold as already presented.  However, based on the total number of 204 firm-
year observations, the cut-off point is 4/204 of 0.020.  Observation-wise analysis 




Table 11 presents the results of running equation (4) after eliminating the fourteen 
identified outliers based on the 0.020 Cook‟s D cut-off point.  The results are similar to 
those presented using the full sample, except that they are more statistically significant.  
Thus, I conclude that the main results are not being driven by outliers. 
 
7.3 Bond-specific features 
To further refine equation (4), I also explore a version which includes some of the bond 
specific characteristics.  Vasvari (2006) uses a covenant index, which is the sum of all 
covenants attached to each specific bond.  My data source for covenants is Mergent 
FISD, which records the covenants for most, but not all, bonds in the sample.  Including 
the covenant index in the regression reduces the sample size to 188 firm-years.  None of 
the bonds in the sample are putable and only sixteen are not senior, but ninety-five of the 
204 bond observations are callable.  I run equation (4) including the covenant index and 
the callable indicator separately and also with them both in the same regression.  As a call 
option is a benefit to the lender, I expect it to be priced into the bond yield and a positive 
co-efficient is expected for the callable bond feature.  For the covenant index, I expect a 
negative co-efficient as covenants are designed to favour the bond holder.  The results are 
presented in Table 12. 
 
The results are not significant at any level for the call or covenant index variables.  The 
covenant index can be explained by a very high degree of correlation between the 
modified bond rating and covenant index.  The Pearson correlation co-efficient between 
the modified bond rating variable and the covenant index is 0.55.  A bond rating is meant 
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to measure both firm and bond characteristics and it appears to be doing this here.  More 
covenants are also associated with weaker firms, which would lead to a high degree of 
correlation between a poorer bond rating and the number of covenants attached to the 
bond.  The results for the call feature might indicate that the higher cash flows that are 
typically required for callable bonds outweigh the negative aspect of the call.  Regardless, 
the main results hold in all settings.  
 
7.4 Non-pulp and paper operating segments 
The proxy for environmental performance is each firm‟s total toxic release inventory 
scaled by domestic sales, based on location of seller.  A possible problem with this 
scaling may arise due to the number of firms operating in more than just the pulp and 
paper segment.  Although non-U.S. sales are eliminated from the denominator, domestic 
sales from non pulp and paper segments are not.   
 
As a first approach to adjust for non pulp and paper operating segments, I scale TRI by 
each firm‟s pulp and paper sales only.  As this is from firms‟ own reports of operating 
segments, it will be somewhat imprecise, as firms‟ methods of reporting segment sales 
change over time and differ between each other.  This denominator will also pick up non 
U.S. sales of pulp and paper.  The results of replacing TRI scaled by U.S. sales with this 
new environmental performance proxy are presented in table 13, panel A.  The regression 
results of scaling by firm wide pulp and paper sales indicate a smaller parameter estimate 
on the environmental performance variable.  In table 13; panel A, the parameter estimate 
for environmental performance is 8.58 basis points.  In panel B, using FGLS, the 
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parameter estimate is 12.88 basis points.  The two estimates are significant at the less 
than ten percent and five percent levels respectively.   
 
I also run a regression with the percentage of a firm‟s total sales that are not pulp and 
paper sales used as a control variable (non-pulp and paper sales divided by total sales).  
These results are presented in table 13, panel C.  Including the percentage of total sales 
that are non-pulp and paper as a control variable has no effect on the results.   
 
As a final approach to control for non-pulp and paper operations, I divide the sample into 
two groups based on the median level of non-pulp and paper sales.  An indicator variable, 
High Non-P&P, is then assigned to firms above the median, with a „0‟ assigned to those 
below the median.  I then interact the TRI/US Sales variable with the indicator variable 
(TRI/US Sales*High Non-P&P) and include the indicator and interaction variable in 
equation (4).  I expect that firms with more non-pulp and paper sales will be less exposed 
to the cluster rules and that the interaction variable will have a moderating effect on the 
environmental performance variable (TRI/US Sales) and that the parameter estimate will 
be negative.  The results are presented in table 13, panel D.  The parameter estimate for 
TRI/US Sales*High Non-P&P is negative as predicted, however it is not significant at 
any conventional level.  For an F-test to check the joint significance of adding the 
parameter estimates for TRI/US Sales and the interaction variable (H0: α1 + α8 = 0) I run 
the model using two-way random effects (FGLS).  The results indicate that the combined 
parameter estimates are statistically significant and that the moderating effect of parsing 




7.5 Non-U.S. segments 
Firms that have a higher percentage of non-U.S. sales may face less exposure to the 
cluster rules and they face a less stringent overall environmental regime.  This would be 
particularly true with respect to private litigation, either by individuals or environmental 
groups.  For instance, compared to Canada, the U.S. is a much more litigious society.  
The U.S. is also much more populous, thus TRI releases are likely to affect a much larger 
population base.  Thus, with the specific mandate of the cluster rules and a more litigious 
„tradition‟ in the United States, I expect that firms with more operations outside the U.S. 
will have less overall exposure to U.S. domestic issues and that the U.S. based 
environmental performance proxy (TRI/US Sales) will be less significant.  It could also 
be argued that the diversification of firms with operations outside the U.S. essentially 
„dilutes‟ the effect of TRI.   
 
To address this, I take the same approach as just previously presented herein for non-pulp 
and paper operations.  I divide the sample firms up based on median non-U.S. sales and 
assign an indicator variable (High non-US) of „1‟ to firms above the median and „0‟ for 
those below the median.  I then create an interaction variable using the indicator variable 
(High non-US) and the environmental performance measure (TRI/US Sales).  I expect 
that the parameter estimate of the interaction variable (TRI/US Sales*High non-US) will 
be negative, supporting the expectation that less exposure to the U.S. cluster rules and 
overall U.S. environmental pressures mitigates the effect of U.S. based environmental 




The results are presented in table 14.  The parameter estimate for the interaction variable 
(TRI/US Sales*High non-US) is negative and significant at the five percent level (α8 = –
18.50, p-value = 0.0489).  As in the previous section, for an F-test to check the joint 
significance of adding the parameter estimates for TRI/US Sales and the interaction 
variable (H0: α1 + α8 = 0) I run the model using two-way random effects (FGLS).  The 
results indicate that the combined parameter estimates are statistically significant.  Thus, 
the effect of parsing out the firms with high non-U.S. sales indicates that firms with more 
internationally diversified operations are less exposed to their environmental performance 
in the U.S. as compared to firms with all, or most, of their operations in the U.S.  
However, their cost of debt is still significantly affected by their environmental 
performance in the U.S.  
 
Another possible aspect of a firm‟s geographic operations that might affect its 
environmental performance is the state (within the United States) in which its operations 
are located.  Some states (i.e. California) have stronger state-based enforcement of 
environmental laws and regulations.  I run equation (4) clustering in two dimensions, by 
firm and by state and controlling for year-effects with year indicators.  The main results 
(unreported) remain similar to those already presented.  However, this regression is based 
on the state in which the sample firms are incorporated, which may be different from 
where its operating facilities are.  To address this, some sort of control must be developed 
to reflect the actual states in which operations occur.  I do not develop such a control 
variable and the relation between environmental performance and the state in which its 
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operations are located remains an open question (and also the way in which that relation 
might affect yield spread).  Regardless, the data I am using is from the U.S. EPA, which 
is a national agency and is mandated to enforce its rules equally throughout the U.S.  
Thus, I expect that any state-based results would be incremental to the main results 
already presented herein.  
 
7.6 Changes 
A changes model will result in less power, but serves as an excellent control for 
correlation in the residuals.  Taking first differences creates much more independence in 
the time-series data.  It also serves to address the potential problem of omitted variables.  
Thus, OLS is an appropriate method to use in a changes model, as long as 
heteroscedasticity is controlled for by using White‟s standard errors.   
 
The process of generating data for a changes model is less than straight-forward.  This is 
because of the thinness of the trading data for the bond market.  For each given bond in 
the sample I need to find a trade of the same bond in the previous year.  Thus, I am trying 
to find a match for the firm‟s specific bond trade from year t, in year t–1.  For many of 
the bond trades, a trade of the same bond in the previous year is not available on the 
Mergent FISD database.  If a trade in the previous year cannot be found, I look to the 
firm‟s bond trade in year t–1 and try to find a matching trade in year t.  The yield spreads 
are then calculated as described in section 4.2.  The final changes sample includes 165 
paired bond trades.  They are not perfectly matched with regards to time to maturity.  The 
difference in time between the two bond trade observations ranges from about six to 
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eighteen months.  This range is the result of the matching bond trades occurring at any 
time in the matching year as opposed to occurring exactly one year apart.  Bond trades 
that occur closer to six months apart will work against finding results in the changes 
model.   
 
The change in environmental performance (TRI/US Sales) represents the difference 
between two adjacent calendar year‟s environmental performance variable.  The 
corresponding change variables are calculated based either on the year-end or on the time 
of the corresponding bond trade.  For the bond rating of the matching bond, I pick up the 
most recent bond rating prior to the trade of the matching bond trade date.  I then run 
equation (2a) to get the matching modified bond rating.  I calculate the matching 
volatility and the Moody‟s Aaa yield spread based on the matching bond trade date and 
the Z-Score is based on the fiscal year.  All matching data is used for first differencing 
against the data from the sample year.  Thus, the changes model is: 
 
ΔYield Spreadit = α0 + α1ΔTRI/U.S. Salesit + α2ΔModified Bond Ratingit +  
α3ΔZ-Scoreit + α4ΔVolatilityit + α5ΔMaturityit +  
α6ΔAaa Spreadit + ε      (6) 
 
Table 15 presents the OLS regression results for equation (6).  The parameter estimate for 
change in TRI/U.S. Sales is 13.01 basis points for each pound of change in toxic releases 
per thousand dollars of U.S. sales.  The estimate is significant at the less than 10% level 
(p-value = 0.0843).  Although this level of significance is marginal, the changes setting is 
58 
 
one that has lower power and the sample size is small.  Thus, these results continue to 
provide evidence inferring that H2 is true and that there is a significant relation between a 
firm‟s cost of debt and its environmental performance. 
 
7.7 Duration 
Years to maturity and Aaa spread are included in the model partly to control for bond 
specific and market wide liquidity.  Another possible control for liquidity is duration.  
Duration puts a heavier weight on cash flows that come earlier in the bonds life.  The 
closer in time that a bond‟s cash flow will occur, the more liquid the bond, as it is less 
sensitive to longer-term interest rate risk.  All of the bonds used in this study pay regular 
coupons, with higher coupon paying bonds having relatively shorter durations.  Non-
coupon paying bonds would have durations that are equal to their maturity.  However, 
with coupon paying bonds, duration will be less than maturity.  The concept of duration 
was first introduced by economist Frederick Macauley in his 1938 book, “Some 
theoretical problems suggested by the movements of interest rates, bond yields & stock 
prices in the United States since 1856”.   The results are presented in table 16.  Duration 
performs in a similar way to maturity, being positively associated with yield spread.  The 




                                                 
18
 As a further control for liquidity I also include the issue size of each particular bond  in the model, with 
insignificant results for issue size and no change to the main results. 
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7.8 Bond Rating 
Graham and Maher (2006) hypothesise that their various measures of Superfund site 
related liabilities will have an effect on the cost of debt over and above that impounded in 
a firm‟s bond rating.  As discussed in section 3.2, the main variable of interest that 
Graham and Maher use is the number of times a firm has been named as a Potentially 
Responsible Party (PRP) at U.S. EPA Superfund sites.  When they include their PRP 
measure in a cost of debt regression, it is a significant variable.  However, when Graham 
and Maher include bond rating and their Superfund liability variable in the same 
regression, their Superfund liability variable is no longer significant.  Graham and Maher 
conclude that bond rating adequately captures these liabilities.   
 
Using the EPA‟s TRI data rather than the Superfund data, I am capturing a 
contemporaneous measure of environmental performance.  Over the twelve year sample 
period, the bond ratings are updated only once every few years.  Thus, although the rating 
agencies clearly state that they incorporate environmental performance into their ratings 
(i.e. Standard and Poor‟s, 2006: pp. 24, 32, 33, 51, 67, 113 and 126) and the results of 
equation (2) show that this is likely true, „stale‟ bond ratings may not perfectly 
incorporate current-year environmental performance.  To explore whether this may be the 
case, I run equation (4) replacing the modified bond rating variable with the actual bond 
rating, converted as previously described herein, to a scale of one to twenty-two where 




The results are presented in table 17, panel A.  The results indicate that the proxy for 
environmental performance provides information beyond that already impounded in bond 
rating.  The results are significant at the ten percent level and still remain economically 
significant (6.73 basis points, p-value= 0.0865).  It is interesting to note that Z-score is 
completely subsumed by the bond rating variable (p-value = 0.2584).  Z-score and the 
underlying variables that make up Z-score are likely well known to bond raters; whereas, 
bond raters may not be as keenly aware of environmental performance in a given year (or 
consider that it warrants a change of bond rating).  With regards to Graham and Maher 
(2006) and bond rating subsuming their proxy for Superfund related liabilities, the time-
lag between a firm‟s act of polluting and the time at which it is taken to task may be 
relevant. 
 
There is now a long history around Superfund sites and a firm will be listed as a 
potentially responsible party (PRP) for many years in a row for the same site.  This 
makes it a much more straight-forward liability for a bond rater to consider.  However, 
the toxic release inventory measure used herein is a measure of a firm‟s toxic chemical 
releases concurrent to the financial statement information used in the model, and within 
approximately six months of the bond trade information used in the model.  This leaves 
much less time for a bond rating to be changed in reaction to a firm‟s environmental 
performance.  Thus, Superfund related liabilities and those related to current 
environmental performance may be unrelated when it comes to cost of debt.  This will be 




In Campbell and Taksler (2003), it is noted that trades by the National Association of 
Insurance Companies (NAIC) may be affected by the difference in reserve ratio 
requirements for insurance companies when they trade in non-investment grade (junk) 
bonds.  When a bond rating goes from BBB– to BB+, the reserve ratio requirement goes 
from one percent to five percent (Campbell and Taksler, 2003, p. 2326).  As discussed in 
section 4.2, the bond trades in the sample used herein are all NAIC trades for the period 
from 1994 through 2003.  In 2004 and 2005, the trades are from the Trade Reporting and 
Compliance Engine (TRACE), which captures a much larger portion of the bond market, 
but still includes many NAIC trades.  To control for the possible non-linear effect on 
yield spread as a bond approaches non-investment grade, I use a logarithmic 
transformation of the bond rating.   
 
However, as the current numerical scaling used has a lower number associated with a 
better bond rating (AAA+ = 1, AAA = 2) I reverse the order, with D = 1, CCC– = 2..... 
AAA = 21 AAA+ = 22.  Taking the log of this reversed bond scale will result in a greater 
spread between each change in bond rating as it approaches non-investment grade (junk) 
and beyond.  I use this log of the reversed bond scale in equation (4), with the results 
presented in Table 17, panel B.  The log of the reversed bond scale is significant at the 
five percent level, but is not as strong a variable as the linear bond scale used previously.  
However, the environmental performance measure picks up more economic significance 
and is more statistically significant than the log version of the bond scale.  Although this 
provides stronger support for H2, using Equation (4) with the actual bond scale as 




As a final step to address the possible non-linear break between investment and non-
investment grade bonds, I divide my sample into two groups.  One consists of all firm-
year observations in which the bond traded was of investment grade (BBB– or better), the 
other consists of non-investment grade bonds (BB+ or worse).  I run regressions using 
equation (4) for both groups separately.  Campbell and Taksler (2003) use only 
investment grade bonds in their sample, thus the reduced sample based on investment 
grade bonds only, is consistent with their approach.  The results are presented in Table 
18, panels A and B.  The breaking up of the sample greatly reduces the sample size, 
making inferences somewhat more tenuous.  The investment grade bond sub-sample 
consists of 156 firm-year observations and 21 firms.  The non-investment grade bond 
sub-sample consists of 48 firm-year observations and 11 firms.   
 
The results for the investment grade bond sub-sample indicate that environmental 
performance affects yield spread for this group.  The parameter estimate is economically 
significant at 7.93 basis points and significant at the ten percent level (p = 0.0754).  
Again, given the small sample size, this continues to support the assertion of H2, that 
environmental performance affects yield spread.  The results of the non-investment grade 
sample are interesting in that the only variable that retains any significance is the Z-score.  
With such a small sample it is difficult to come to any conclusions, but it is not surprising 
that once a bond reaches non-investment, or junk, status the yield spread is dominated by 




7.9 PRP versus TRI as a measure of environmental performance 
When a pollution measure is based on TRI its purpose is to measure some form of 
environmental performance (i.e. Klassen, 2001; Clarkson, Li and Richardson, 2004; Al-
Tuwarji et al., 2004).  This measure is meant to be a function of a firm‟s current 
activities.  The Superfund related literature discussed in section 3.1 characterises the 
Superfund site related measures as ones that measure part of a firm‟s environmental 
liabilities (i.e. Barth and McNichols, 1994; Graham and Maher, 2006).  The most 
significant measure used is the number of times a firm is named as a potentially 
responsible party, or PRP.   I am unaware of any cases in which TRI and PRP have been 
used in the same model.  It is possible that these two measures are proxies for the same 
thing. 
 
However, there are many reasons to believe that this is not the case, particularly with 
regards to the pulp and paper industry.  Most PRPs are named on sites which are related 
to soil and groundwater contamination.  Of the 1,156 Superfund sites studied in Barth and 
McNichols (1994, p.189) only twelve were related to waterways or creeks.   Barth and 
McNichols also list the most predominate industries in their sample.  SIC 26, paper and 
allied products, is not one of them.  In the pulp and paper industry most of the pollution is 
either sent up the smokestack or down the river.  For example, in 2000 the total TRI for 
SIC 26, paper and allied products; was 253 million pounds.  Of that, 205 million pounds 
were released to the air, 22 million pounds were released to surface water, 17 million 
pounds were disposed of on land and the remaining 8 million pounds were sent off-site.  
A review of industry 10-Ks indicates that with only a couple exceptions, the PRPs in the 
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pulp and paper industry are related to landfill sites as opposed to air and water emissions. 
This might be a reason why the cluster rules have been specifically developed to address 
air and water pollution.   
 
Another reason to conclude that the TRI and PRP measures are different is the time-lag 
between when a firm‟s activities lead to site contamination and when it is named as a 
PRP.  For example, Wausau Paper is related to only one remediation site (and only at the 
State level), which is a landfill.  The contamination at the site goes back to pre-1986 and 
remains unresolved in 2005.  Another example is Domtar, which is a PRP at a number of 
sites, as reported in its annual reports from 2000 to 2005.  It states in each year‟s annual 
report that these sites relate to their wood-preserving business, which was divested in 
1993.  An extreme example is Union Camp Corporation, which reported in 1995 that it 
might be responsible for part of a $35 million clean-up at a Superfund site in Louisiana.  
The site had been in operation from 1882 to 1972.  American Creosoting operated on the 
site from 1933 to 1958.  Union Camp bought the assets of American Creosoting in 1956 
and sold them in 1962.  In March 1996, Union Camp was named a PRP on the site. 
 
In the sample firms‟ 10-Ks, environmental costs due to the cluster rules are typically 
described as material.   However, all but one firm claim that liabilities related to 
Superfund sites are immaterial.  The cluster rules relate to air and water quality and are 
discussed by all firms in the years from 1994 through the late nineties and beyond, as the 
rules were first introduced.  For example, in 2001 Westvaco reported that it had made 
expenditures of $110 million to comply with cluster rule regulations and expected to have 
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to make a further $70 million of expenditures in the coming years.  It also reports that it 
is named as a PRP at a number of environmental waste sites and that it has accrued $5 
million dollars to cover its share of anticipated clean-up costs. Willamette Industries is 
not named as a PRP in any year, but estimated that compliance with the cluster rules will 
require $120 million in capital expenditures.   
 
As a final point, it should be noted that the Superfund based studies are top-down, multi-
industry studies.  This may create a selection and survivorship bias.    Barth and 
McNichols (1994) create their sample through searching on Nexis.  This may result in 
larger firms being picked up in the sample and many smaller PRPs not being included in 
the sample.  Graham and Maher (2006) use new bond issuers from March 1, 1995 to 
February 28, 1998.  This may also pick up only large firms.  The results of Graham and 
Maher (2006) show that a PRP designation leads to a higher yield spread for firms 
issuing new debt.  Graham and Maher start with the list of 36,429 PRPs listed on the U.S. 
EPA database for the period of their sample (1995-1998).  After matching this to firms 
issuing new debt over this period and to firms with the required Compustat data, the final 
sample represents 357 new bond issues.   
 
The one industry sample that I use in this study, captures as much of a single industry as 
is possible given the data limitations. Of the pollutants released over the twelve year 
sample period, I capture more than sixty percent of the total releases in the industry.  The 
sample period represents a time over which significant consolidation occurred in the pulp 
and paper industry.  I expect that as weaker firms are acquired, the stronger firms will 
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increase the number of times that they are named as PRPs.  When International Paper 
took over Union Camp in 1999, it also took over as PRP on the Superfund sites related to 
Union Camp.  Thus, it is possible that in a one industry, longitudinal study a higher 
incidence of being named as PRP may indicate that the firm is more financially sound.  
This would be reflected in a firm‟s cost of debt. The pulp and paper sample used in this 
paper picks up a time-series in a single industry.   Over the sample period, there is much 
consolidation.  As a polluting industry consolidates, the stronger firms will absorb the 
weaker ones.  However, they will also absorb the PRP designations.   
 
To investigate this, I review the 10-Ks of all of the sample firms from 1994 to 2005.  It is 
a requirement that firms state whether or not they are involved at a Superfund site as a 
PRP under legal proceedings. There is also typically a subsequent note to the financial 
statements stating the amount accrued relating to these sites and a statement as to whether 
the impact will be material.  Of the 204 firm-years reviewed, the number of times that a 
firm is named as a PRP is given 130 times by eighteen different firms.  This includes 58 
firm-years in which a sample firm is not named as a PRP.  In the remaining 74 firm-
years, the number of times a firm is named as a PRP is characterised by one of four 
descriptive words.  The firms describe themselves as being named as PRPs at several, 
various, a number of, or numerous Superfund sites.  Some firms change from presenting 
an actual number to a description, over the sample period, and vice versa.  For example, 
in 1997 Weyerhaeuser states that it is named as a PRP at 43 sites; then from 1998 to 2001 
it states that it is named as a PRP at numerous sites.  In 2002 and beyond, it switches 




Including this data in the main model (equation 4) would provide evidence as to whether 
there is a strong survivorship bias in a multi-year, one industry study with regards to 
Superfund sites.  I utilise the data in two ways.  The first is to include only the firms that 
specifically state the number of sites at which they are PRPs.  The second is based on an 
estimate of the number of times a firm is named as a PRP for those firms that do not 
specifically report it.  The estimated number of times a firm is named as a PRP is based 
first on adjacent years, if the firm reports the actual number in adjacent years.  Firms that 
do not report the specifics will use certain words to describe the number of times they are 
named as a PRP.  Thus, when no adjacent data exists I convert the following descriptive 
words to a number as follows: numerous = 50, a number = 20 and several = 10.  The 
firm-year data is presented in Table 19.   
 
How to scale the PRP data is again a question, as scaling was a question when dealing 
with the TRI data in the discussion presented in section 4.3.  Barth and McNichols (1994) 
use a market value of equity model and scale all of their variables by the number of 
shares outstanding to control for heteroscedasticity.  Graham and Maher scale their PRP 
measure by total assets in their cost of debt model.  I have been scaling the TRI based 
measure by U.S. sales as previously described herein.  As equation (4) is a cost of debt 
model and not a market value of equity model, I scale the PRP number by total assets, to 
be consistent with Graham and Maher and also by U.S. Sales, to be consistent with this 




The Pearson correlations between the number of times a firm is named as a PRP (without 
any scaling) and the same number scaled by total assets and U.S. sales are presented in 
table 20.  I also present the scaled data, using the larger sample from the estimated times 
a firm is named as a PRP, in table 20.  Significantly negative correlations exist between 
the scaled PRP measures and yield spread, TRI/U.S. Sales and bond rating.  There is also 
a very strong relation between the number of times a firm is named as a PRP and firm 
size (market value of equity).  A significant correlation also exists between size and PRP 
scaled by U.S. sales.  These univariate associations support the position that industry 
survivors will pick up PRP designations as a polluting industry consolidates. 
 
Including the respective PRP measures in equation (4) results in the following model: 
 
Yield Spread =    α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2 Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score +  
 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6AaaSpread + α7PRP/Total Assets (US Sales)  
or α7PRPest/Total Assets (US Sales) + ε   (7) 
The predicted signs are α1 > 0, α2 > 0, α3 < 0, α4 > 0, α5 = ?, α6 > 0 and α7 = ?. 
 
The variables for α1 through α6 are as described in section 4.  PRP/Total Assets (US 
Sales) is the number of times a firm reports itself as being named a PRP, scaled by total 
assets (U.S. sales); PRPest/Total Assets (US Sales) uses the actual number reported and 
an estimate for years where specific numbers are not reported, scaled by total assets (U.S. 
sales).  The results for the PRP measures scaled by total assets are presented in table 21, 
panels A and B.  The results when PRP is scaled by U.S. sales are similar.  In all cases, 
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the sign on the PRP variable is negative; however it is insignificant at conventional 
levels.  If a negative parameter estimate is predicted and one-tailed test is used, the 
parameter estimates presented are significantly less than zero at the ten percent level.  
Thus, if the results are to indicate anything, they indicate that in the pulp and paper 
industry, carrying more PRP related liabilities is typical of the surviving firms in the 
industry.   
 
The environmental performance variable (TRI/US Sales), when in the same regression as 
the PRP variables, is of a reduced magnitude but remains significant at the less than five 
percent level.  Thus, I conclude that the measure of environmental performance based on 
the TRI is a different measure than the number of times a firm is named as a PRP.   
 
7.10 TRI Lag 
As a final sensitivity check, I look to a one year lag of the main environmental 
performance variable, TRI/US Sales.  The first time that the raw TRI becomes available 
is in the September of the calendar year following the year in which the polluting activity 
occurred.  It is not until March of the second year following the polluting activity that the 
full detailed data is available on the EPA‟s TRI database. Thus, in March 2008 the full 
online TRI data is released for calendar year 2006.  The assumption up to this point has 
been that the market is aware of a firm‟s environmental performance prior to the release 
of the TRI data.  The results already presented herein are consistent with this assumption.  
However, whether a firm‟s yield spread is affected by its environmental performance 
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from the previous year would serve to see if there is a lag effect.  Thus, I run equation (4) 
using the TRI from the previous year.  The resulting equation is: 
 
Yield Spreadit =    α0 + α1TRI/US Salesit-1 + α2 Modified Bond Ratingit +  
α3Z-Scoreit + α4Volatilityit + α5Maturityit  
+ α6AaaSpreadit + ε      (8) 
 
This lag approach also serves to address possible concerns over endogeneity.  Relatively 
better environmental performance may just be a function of other variables that affect the 
cost of debt.  Going back in time by a one-year lag creates a greater degree of separation 
between the proxy for environmental performance and any potentially related variables.  
In a given year, a firm that has superior economic performance may also have the ability 
invest more heavily in environmental technology.  The TRI proxy used in equation (4) 
already has a certain amount of lag, as environmental performance in a given year will be 
the result of decisions made in years previous.  Increasing the lag by another year will 
result in a proxy for environmental performance that is less related to contemporaneous 
firm level results.  Thus, the lag variable can be characterised as an instrumental variable 
that is independent of any other variables used (or omitted) in the model.
19
    
 
Table 22 presents the results of equation (8).  The results show that the lag measure of 
environmental performance is also significant (α1 = 14.46, p-value = 0.0016).  This result 
                                                 
19
 As a further method to address potential omitted variables, I create a return on assets indicator variable 
using X3 from the Z-score calculation (EBIT/Total Assets).  The assumption is that better managers will 
generate a better return.  Firm-years above the median are coded as 1, zero otherwise.  Including this 
indicator variable in equation (4) leaves the original results unchanged. 
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is similar to that using the TRI from the current year.  The Pearson correlation between 
the TRI/US Salesit-1 and the TRI/US Salesit has a correlation of 0.885 (p-value < 0.0001).  
This high degree of correlation implies that either measure works well as a proxy for 
environmental performance.  However, it is not surprising that there is a high degree of 
correlation from one year to the next.  A twenty percent reduction in TRI, holding sales 
constant, would be considered a major improvement in environmental performance.  Yet 
this also implies a correlation of 0.8, which is considered a high level of year to year 
correlation.  This may be the reason that the changes model presented in section 7.6 
herein has significant results, despite the very high degree of correlation from year to 
year in the measure of environmental performance. 
 
These results do raise the question as to just how the market picks up on changes and 
trends in firm level environmental performance.  I am using the EPA‟s TRI data as a 
proxy for environmental performance.  As this information is released to the public in 
detailed form almost fifteen months after the year-end in which the pollution occurs, the 
information dynamics must be such that a firm‟s environmental performance is evident to 
the public at an earlier point in time.  To investigate this, I contacted a senior analyst at 
Jantzi Research.  Jantzi Research is the leading research firm in Canada on social and 
environmental investing.  They also work in concert with KLD Research and Analytics, 
the leading research firm in the United States in the same area.  The analyst stated that 
they do follow closely the emissions data, particularly trends, but that it is used more as a 
back-up to more timely firm based research.  Thus, if a particular firm is very weak in its 
reporting, giving very little detail as to its environmental initiatives (i.e. environmental 
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capital expenditures) and overall performance in its own reports, they would expect to see 
higher emissions reported when the data is released.  The opposite would be true if a firm 
was reporting that it was taking initiatives to improve its performance and reporting that 
it was cleaning up its emissions.  This serves to support the use of the EPA‟s TRI data as 
an ex-post measure of environmental performance in a given year, while assuming that 
the market can pick up on relative environmental performance on a timelier basis. 
 
Overall, the sensitivity analyses presented in section 7 continue to indicate that 
hypothesis two should not be rejected.  Thus, the conclusion that a lower yield spread for 
lower polluting firms still holds.  The fact that the main results still hold using an 
alternate specification, changes model, controlling for foreign operations, bond 




8 Conclusions and Limitations 
The results presented in the previous sections provide evidence that higher polluting 
firms are deemed a riskier investment by the debt market.  The main results imply that 
this risk is priced at a premium of 17.13 basis points in yield spread for each pound of 
toxic chemicals released per $1,000 U.S. sales (the average sample firm releases 2.2 
pounds per $1,000 U.S. sales).  This represents a material effect on the cost of debt 
capital that is consistent with the results found when exploring firm value and 
environmental liabilities.  Given that bond holders and shareholders often have 
conflicting goals, these results could not be taken as a given before this study was 
undertaken.  Thus, as pervious research has shown that equity holders value relatively 
superior environmental performance (i.e. Cormier and Magnan, 1997; Clarkson, Li and 
Richardson, 2004), this study serves to provide evidence that bond holders‟ and 
shareholders‟ interests are aligned when it comes to environmental performance, with 
relatively better environmental performance seen as a benefit for both types of investors.  
It also reinforces the use of environmental performance as a measure of management 
performance.  Managers tend to pay attention to the items on which they are measured.  If 
environmental performance is made an important aspect of the way in which managers 
are judged, it will serve to benefit all investors (and the general public as well). 
 
A potential weakness of this study is that it focuses on one industry and one country.  
There is now increasingly robust data from which to work.  The European Union has 
begun to report its version of the TRI for firms operating within the EU.  Canada and 
Mexico are also tracking similar data.  In 2006, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an 
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attempt by the Bush administration to rule that CO2 emissions are not pollutants and thus, 
could not be tracked by the EPA (as they would then be outside of the EPA‟s 
jurisdiction).  The EPA can now treat CO2 as a pollutant and track its release, which will 
provide an opportunity to include greenhouse gases in measures of environmental 
performance.  Thus, expanding the scope of this study by continually updating the data, 
including other polluting industries in the sample, and expanding the sample to firms‟ 
operations outside the U.S. is a logical next step.  
 
Model specification has been a cause for debate in the environmental accounting and 
finance literature.  This is due to the possibility that a firm‟s financial performance and 
environmental performance are jointly determined.  There are also latent variables that 
might be the underlying cause of environmental performance, such as managerial 
competency and attitude.  Thus, it cannot be ruled out that superior environmental 
performance is simply an artefact of other firm-specific characteristics.   
 
In any case, industry-wide and firm-specific environmental performance is now a 
mainstream issue.  If superior environmental performance is an indicator of other 
underlying firm characteristics, it is important firm-specific information in which 
investors will be interested.  Given the difficulty in aggregating firms‟ EPA toxic release 
inventory data, recent calls for more cooperation between the EPA and the SEC are well 
founded.  The results of this paper indicate that the debt market is capable of aggregating 
this information; however, it is not readily accessible to the general public on a firm by 
firm basis.  It would take almost no effort for firms to be required to aggregate and report 
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publicly their firm-wide release of polluting chemicals, including CO2 and related gases.  
It already has to be reported to the EPA on a facility by facility basis.  However, for a 
concerned citizen or individual investor to do this is an extremely onerous task.  Thus, as 
this information is most likely value-relevant, calls for it to be made public on a firm-




Appendix A: Yield spread calculation for TRACE transactions 
 
a. Trade execution date as per TRACE:    May 2, 2005 
b. Maturity Date of the bond as per FISD:    November 11, 2011 
c. Time to maturity of bond (b-a):     6.54 Years 
d. Yield to Maturity of bond as per TRACE:   8.25% 
 
e. Yield to Maturity of 7 yr. Treasury Bond;  
May 2, 2005 as per Federal Reserve:    5.03% 
 
f. Yield to Maturity of 5 yr. Treasury Bond;  
May 2, 2005 as per Federal Reserve:    4.98 % 
 
g. Weight of 7 year bond ([6.54 years-5 years] over 2 years): 0.77 
 
h. Weight of 5 year bond ([7 years-6.54 years] over 2 years): 0.23 
 
i. Weighted Average Benchmark Treasury (e*g + f*h):  5.02% 
 





Table 1: Descriptive statistics and variable definition 
Panel A: Descriptive Statistics 
 N MEAN Median STD MIN MAX 
Yield Spread 204 199 143 143 9 723 
TRI („000s) 204 9,422 4,624 11,295 174 58,221 
TRI/US Sales 204 2.20 2.0722.07 1.40 0.09 7.93 
Bond Rating 204 11.13 11.00 3.06 5.00 19.00 
Modified Bond 
Rating 204 0.01 -0.16 2.08 -3.64 5.83 
Z-Score 204 2.28 2.12 1.13 -0.97 5.97 
Volatility 204 22.81% 21.41% 8.68% 8.42% 54.73% 
Maturity 204 12.67 9.05 8.65 0.72 30.09 
Aaa Spread 204 159 135 62 78 346 
 
Table 1, panel B: Variable Definitions 
Yield Spread 
 
The basis point spread (100 basis points = 1%) between the yield to maturity of 




The total annual pounds of toxic chemicals released to land, air or water as per the 
United States Environmental Protection Agency (Toxic Release Inventory), 
presented in thousands of pounds. 
TRI/US Sales 
 
Pounds of toxic chemicals released (TRI) per $1,000 of U. S. sales, based on 
location of seller. 
Bond Rating 
 
A firm‟s S&P bond rating converted to an ordinal from 1 to 22, where AAA+ = 1, 
AAA = 2, etc.  In two cases Moody‟s rating was used, Fitch in one case. 
Modified Bond 
Rating 
The residual of regressing bond rating onto TRI/US Sales + Z-Score + Volatility; 




Altman‟s Z-Score, where Z = 1.2*(Working Capital/Total Assets) + 
1.4*(Retained Earnings/Total Assets) + 3.3*EBIT/Total Assets + 0.6*(Market 
Value of Equity/Book Value of Total Liabilities) + Sales/Total Assets. 
Volatility 
 
The annualised standard deviation of the sample firms‟ mean returns for the year 
prior to the bond trade used to calculate Yield Spread. 
Maturity 
 





The spread (in basis points) between the average Moody‟s Aaa bond yield and the 














Rating Volatility Z-Score  Maturity 
TRI -0.0322        
p-value 0.6475        
TRI/US Sales 0.35686 0.12462       
p-value <.0001 0.0758       
Bond Rating 0.77576 0.03962 0.43102      
p-value <.0001 0.5736 <.0001      
Modified Rating 0.43012 -0.16019 0.00378 0.68129     
p-value <.0001 0.0221 0.9572 <.0001     
Volatility 0.60223 -0.11335 0.11681 0.47883 0.09173    
p-value <.0001 0.1065 0.0962 <.0001 0.1919 0.0059   
Z-Score -0.46737 -0.27532 -0.47752 -0.65123 -0.0058 -0.19203   
p-value <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9344 0.0059 0.2715  
Maturity -0.13205 0.07016 0.01938 -0.24204 -0.22202 -0.19242 0.07734  
p-value 0.0597 0.3187 0.7832 0.0005 0.0014 0.0058 0.2715  
Aaa Spread 0.2581 -0.00668 -0.00667 0.07155 -0.1568 0.30935 -0.1292 -0.0852 
p-value 0.0002 0.9245 0.9246 0.3092 0.0251 <.0001 0.0656 0.2259 








Bond Rating = α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Z-Score + α3Volatility + ε  
Method:  Cluster in one-dimension (Firm), One-way fixed effects (Year). N = 204 
firm-years, 26 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  8.32 1.02 8.17 <.0001 0.732 
TRI/US Sales + 0.30 0.16 1.86 0.0373 
 Z-score – -1.25 0.21 -5.95 <.0001 
 Volatility + 22.28 2.74 8.14 <.0001 
 Y95  0.44 0.35 1.27 0.2150 
 Y96  0.99 0.44 2.24 0.0344 
 Y97  -0.36 0.49 -0.73 0.4744 
 Y98  -1.63 0.50 -3.27 0.0032 
 Y99  -2.14 0.50 -4.26 0.0003 
 Y00  -1.95 0.61 -3.18 0.0039 
 Y01  -0.67 0.63 -1.06 0.2990 
 Y02  -1.06 0.67 -1.57 0.1295 
 Y03  1.59 0.43 3.68 0.0011 
 Y04  1.99 0.49 4.08 0.0004 
 Y05  2.61 0.55 4.72 <.0001 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables are as per 
Table 1, Panel B, except for year indicators. Year indicators are binary variables, years 






Table 3, panel B 
Model:  
 
Bond Ratingit = α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Z-Score + α3Volatility + ε  
Method:  Two-way fixed effects (Firm and Year).  N = 204 firm-years, 26 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  18.70 0.66 28.23 <.0001 0.9510 
TRI/US Sales + 0.23 0.09 2.59 0.0053   
Z-score – -0.14 0.11 -1.29 0.0991   
Volatility + 3.28 1.37 2.39 0.0089   
N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables are as per 
Table 1, Panel B.  Firm and year parameter estimates not reported. 
 




Bond Rating = α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Z-Score + α3Volatility + ε  
Method:  OLS with year fixed effects.  N = 204 firm-years, 26 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  8.32 0.67 12.45 <.0001 0.7122 
TRI/US Sales + 0.30 0.09 3.19 0.0009   
Z-score – -1.25 0.12 -10.29 <.0001   
Volatility + 22.28 1.71 13.04 <.0001   
N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Errors are White‟s 










Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + ε 
Method:  Cluster in one-dimension (Firm), One-way fixed effects (Year). N = 204 firm-
years, 26 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  -66.98 63.36 -1.06 0.3006 0.7896 
TRI/US Sales + 17.13 5.03 3.41 0.0011 
 Modified Bond Rating + 30.16 6.19 4.87 <.0001 
 Z-Score – -37.26 11.16 -3.34 0.0013 
 Volatility + 642.31 166.80 3.85 0.0004 
 Maturity  1.76 0.66 2.68 0.0128 
 Aaa Spread + 0.85 0.39 2.18 0.0194 
 Y95  -3.30 18.36 -0.18 0.8586 
 Y96  9.28 19.02 0.49 0.6299 
 Y97  22.32 19.59 1.14 0.2652 
 Y98  1.20 22.67 0.05 0.9583 
 Y99  65.47 39.23 1.67 0.1076 
 Y00  -1.67 48.37 -0.03 0.9727 
 Y01  -12.80 40.69 -0.31 0.7557 
 Y02  -59.71 66.93 -0.89 0.3808 
 Y03  -61.01 44.58 -1.37 0.1833 
 Y04  44.95 25.35 1.77 0.0884 
 Y05  91.21 33.90 2.69 0.0125 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables are as per Table 
1, Panel B, except year indicators.  Year indicators are binary variables, years 1995 through 2005, 






Table 4, panel B 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + ε 
Method:  Two way random effects, year and firm (FGLS).   
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  -32.87 45.72 -0.72 0.4731 0.4735 
TRI/US Sales + 21.20 6.43 3.30 0.0006 
 Modified Bond Rating + 31.39 4.18 7.52 <.0001 
 Z-Score - -50.75 8.18 -6.20 <.0001 
 Volatility + 805.97 101.80 7.92 <.0001 
 Maturity  2.30 0.78 2.95 0.0036 
 Aaa Spread + 0.50 0.16 3.21 0.0008 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables are as per Table 
1, Panel B. 
Table 4, panel C 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + ε 
Method:  OLS with year fixed effects.   
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  -66.98 46.76 -1.43 0.1537 0.6950 
TRI/US Sales + 17.13 4.56 3.76 0.0002 
 Modified Bond Rating + 30.16 3.53 8.54 <.0001 
 Z-Score - -37.26 5.89 -6.33 <.0001 
 Volatility + 642.31 94.89 6.77 <.0001 
 Maturity  1.76 0.69 2.54 0.0118 
 Aaa Spread + 0.85 0.26 3.24 0.0014 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables are as per Table 





Table 5: Yield spread as dependent variable, between groups OLS 
Model:  
 
Yield Spreadi = α0 + α1TRI/US Salesi + α2Modified Bond Ratingi + α3Z-Scorei 
+ α4Volatilityi + α5Maturityi + α6Aaa Spreadi + εi 
Method:  Between groups OLS (by firm, n = 26).   
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  -59.78 92.52 -0.65 0.5259 0.7852 
TRI/US Sales + 31.43 11.38 2.76 0.0062 
 Modified Bond Rating + 41.59 11.38 3.65 0.0009 
 Z-Score - -21.36 14.09 -1.52 0.0730 
 Volatility + 539.43 246.93 2.18 0.0209 
 Maturity  1.07 2.05 0.52 0.6085 
 Aaa Spread + 0.60 0.47 1.28 0.1075 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables are as per Table 




Table 6: Annual Regressions 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + ε 
Method:  OLS by year.  
1994 (N= 17) 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  192.56 169.03 1.14 0.2812 0.7797 
TRI/US Sales + -12.24 10.08 -1.21 0.7476 
 Modified Bond Rating + 23.07 8.06 2.86 0.0085 
 Z-Score – -55.38 11.06 -5.01 0.0003 
 Volatility + 527.62 314.24 1.68 0.0621 
 Maturity  0.82 1.33 0.62 0.5496 
 Aaa Spread + -0.12 1.08 -0.11 0.9171 
 1995 (N = 19) 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  -92.29 232.49 -0.40 0.6984 0.7002 
TRI/US Sales  48.87 21.72 2.25 0.0220 
 Modified Bond Rating + 14.94 14.07 1.06 0.1546 
 Z-Score – -26.93 20.38 -1.32 0.1056 
 Volatility + 1001.43 277.89 3.60 0.0018 
 Maturity  2.35 2.38 0.99 0.3440 
 Aaa Spread + -0.38 1.85 -0.20 0.8428 
 1996 (N = 19) 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  -334.05 390.46 -0.86 0.409 0.4444 
TRI/US Sales  34.89 21.45 1.63 0.0649 
 Modified Bond Rating + 16.39 15.06 1.09 0.1490 
 Z-Score – -45.39 26.78 -1.69 0.0580 
 Volatility + 772.93 509.54 1.52 0.0776 
 Maturity  0.25 2.13 0.12 0.9077 
 Aaa Spread + 3.53 3.82 0.92 0.1872 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables are as per Table 
1, Panel B.  Errors are White‟s standard errors.  Fixed-effects parameter estimates not reported.  




Table 6, continued: Annual Regressions 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + ε 
Method:  OLS by year.   
1997 (N = 20) 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  -70.87262 156.3734 -0.45 0.6579 0.6908 
TRI/US Sales  25.44567 18.79228 1.35 0.0994 
 Modified Bond Rating + 38.15645 14.66995 2.6 0.0110 
 Z-Score - -29.89624 17.76494 -1.68 0.0581 
 Volatility + 746.71311 554.6442 1.35 0.1006 
 Maturity  2.2605 2.64399 0.85 0.4081 
 Aaa Spread + 0.54932 0.54437 1.01 0.1657 
 1998 (N = 20) 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  -539.33 453.50 -1.19 0.2556 0.7069 
TRI/US Sales  35.14 17.96 1.96 0.0361 
 Modified Bond Rating + 23.66 18.39 1.29 0.11035 
 Z-Score – -25.05 28.36 -0.88 0.1966 
 Volatility + 971.63 395.79 2.45 0.01445 
 Maturity  -0.14 2.67 -0.05 0.9584 
 Aaa Spread + 3.01 3.03 0.99 0.169 
 1999 (N = 19) 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  -82.82 222.85 -0.37 0.7166 0.5468 
TRI/US Sales  -20.55 22.06 -0.93 0.1850 
 Modified Bond Rating + 26.43 16.78 1.57 0.0707 
 Z-Score – -42.86 23.43 -1.83 0.0462 
 Volatility + 437.29 547.40 0.80 0.2200 
 Maturity  5.62 2.69 2.09 0.0585 
 Aaa Spread + 2.19 0.92 2.40 0.0169 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables are as per Table 
1, Panel B.  Errors are White‟s standard errors.  Fixed-effects parameter estimates not reported.  




Table 6, continued: Annual Regressions 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + ε 
Method:  OLS by year.   
2000 (N = 16) 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  504.95 283.52 1.78 0.1086 0.5487 
TRI/US Sales  0.89 14.58 0.06 0.4765 
 Modified Bond Rating + 36.19 10.33 3.5 0.0034 
 Z-Score – -51.03 18.09 -2.82 0.0100 
 Volatility + -160.17 244.59 -0.65 0.2645 
 Maturity  2.65 1.91 1.39 0.1992 
 Aaa Spread + -0.29 1.07 -0.27 0.7935 
 2001 (N = 15) 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  -65.81 115.64 -0.57 0.5849 0.7114 
TRI/US Sales  -1.06 13.56 -0.08 0.4699 
 Modified Bond Rating + 0.65 11.74 0.06 0.4786 
 Z-Score – -59.57 22.16 -2.69 0.0138 
 Volatility + 518.15 201.45 2.57 0.0165 
 Maturity  1.23 2.11 0.58 0.5758 
 Aaa Spread + 1.29 0.42 3.10 0.0074 
 2002 (N = 15) 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  -804.67 652.17 -1.23 0.2523 0.5573 
TRI/US Sales  23.59 20.38 1.16 0.1402 
 Modified Bond Rating + 48.79 19.22 2.54 0.0174 
 Z-Score – -39.79 41.49 -0.96 0.1828 
 Volatility + 1051.35 367.97 2.86 0.0106 
 Maturity  -1.46 5.01 -0.29 0.7781 
 Aaa Spread + 3.03 2.42 1.25 0.1227 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables are as per Table 
1, Panel B.  Errors are White‟s standard errors.  Fixed-effects parameter estimates not reported.  




Table 6, continued: Annual Regressions 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + ε 
Method:  OLS by year.   
2003 (N = 15) 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  324.56 214.95 1.51 0.1695 0.7728 
TRI/US Sales  22.05 14.73 1.50 0.0865 
 Modified Bond Rating + 55.39 13.73 4.04 0.0019 
 Z-Score – 1.66 19.84 0.08 0.9353 
 Volatility + -7.71 354.63 -0.02 0.9832 
 Maturity  10.58 3.12 3.39 0.0095 
 Aaa Spread + -1.47 0.91 -1.62 0.0720 
 2004 (N = 15) 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  137.84 287.86 0.48 0.6449 0.8145 
TRI/US Sales  34.77 11.46 3.03 0.0081 
 Modified Bond Rating + 50.31 10.56 4.76 0.0007 
 Z-Score - -0.35 18.21 -0.02 0.9852 
 Volatility + 567.64 338.11 1.68 0.1317 
 Maturity  6.56 3.46 1.89 0.0947 
 Aaa Spread + -1.89 1.98 -0.96 0.1833 
 2005 (N = 14) 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  -664.16 451.63 -1.47 0.1849 0.8526 
TRI/US Sales  25.44 12.58 2.02 0.0415 
 Modified Bond Rating + 27.03 8.70 3.11 0.0086 
 Z-Score - -9.50 24.69 -0.38 0.7119 
 Volatility + 872.98 446.11 1.96 0.0912 
 Maturity  7.20 3.65 1.97 0.0897 
 Aaa Spread + 6.97 5.13 1.36 0.1083 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables are as per Table 
1, Panel B.  Errors are White‟s standard errors.  Fixed-effects parameter estimates not reported.  







Table 7: Fama-MacBeth 
Model:  
 
Yield Spreadt = α0 + α1TRI/US Salest + α2Modified Bond Ratingt + α3Z-Scoret + 
α4Volatilityt + α5Maturityt + α6Aaa Spreadt + εt 
Method:  Fama-MacBeth (1973).   
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
 Intercept  -124.51 398.43 -0.31 0.7600 
 TRI/US Sales  18.10 21.38 0.85 0.2069 
 Modified Bond Rating + 30.09 16.23 1.85 0.0443 
 Z-Score – -32.01 20.77 -1.54 0.0747 
 Volatility + 608.32 383.13 1.59 0.0692 
 Maturity  3.16 3.57 0.88 0.3940 
 Aaa Spread + 1.37 2.51 0.54 0.2980 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables are as per Table 














Rating Volatility Z-score Maturity 
Aaa 
Spread Leverage Coverage Current 
TRI/US Sales 0.3569 
          
 
<.0001 
          Bond Scale 0.7758 0.4310 
         
 
<.0001 <.0001 
         Mod. Bond Rating 0.4301 0.0038 0.6813 
        
 
<.0001 0.9572 <.0001 
        Volatility 0.6022 0.1168 0.4788 0.0917 
       
 
<.0001 0.0962 <.0001 0.1919 
       Z-score -0.4674 -0.4775 -0.6512 -0.0058 -0.1920 
      
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.9344 0.0059 
      Maturity -0.1321 0.0194 -0.2420 -0.2220 -0.1924 0.0773 
     
 
0.0597 0.7832 0.0005 0.0014 0.0058 0.2715 
     Aaa Spread 0.2581 -0.0067 0.0716 -0.1568 0.3094 -0.1292 -0.0852 
    
 
0.0002 0.9246 0.3092 0.0251 <.0001 0.0656 0.2259 
    Leverage 0.5241 0.2697 0.6350 0.3151 0.3885 -0.5455 -0.1317 0.0325 
   
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0605 0.6446 
   Coverage -0.3980 -0.3633 -0.5232 0.0212 -0.1704 0.8355 0.0653 -0.0910 -0.3585 
  
 
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.7633 0.0148 <.0001 0.3535 0.1954 <.0001 
  Current Ratio 0.0495 0.0348 0.1750 0.3569 0.1795 0.2140 -0.1694 -0.1362 -0.0433 0.0912 
 
 
0.4822 0.6210 0.0123 <.0001 0.0102 0.0021 0.0154 0.0522 0.5390 0.1945 
 Size -0.2780 -0.3051 -0.4885 -0.2491 -0.2480 0.4203 0.0717 0.0538 -0.2491 0.3751 -0.3819 
 




Table 8, Panel B: Variable definitions 
TRI/US Sales, Bond Scale, Mod. Bond Rating, Volatility, Z-score, Maturity and Aaa spread are as described in table 1; panel B.  
Alternate variables not described in table 1, panel B are:  
Leverage  Total debt divided by total assets 
Coverage Earnings before interest and taxes divided by interest expense (times interest earned) 
Current (Current assets minus current liabilities) divided by total assets 
Size Total market value of equity 









Yield Spread =    α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Leverage + α3Coverage +  
α4Current + α5Volatility + α6Size + ε  
Method:  Cluster in one-dimension (Firm), One-way fixed effects (Year). N = 204 
firm-years, 26 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  -117.47 38.19 -3.08 0.005 0.6202 
TRI/US Sales + 18.99 6.65 2.86 0.009 
 Leverage + 170.81 70.42 2.43 0.023 
 Coverage – -2.60 2.61 -0.99 0.330 
 Current – -188.94 167.53 -1.13 0.270 
 Volatility + 854.22 182.77 4.67 <.0001 
 Size – -0.0014 0.0015 -0.94 0.358 
 Y95  12.98 15.29 0.85 0.404 
 Y96  31.81 19.97 1.59 0.124 
 Y97  21.15 25.73 0.82 0.419 
 Y98  -11.31 23.66 -0.48 0.637 
 Y99  29.42 38.82 0.76 0.456 
 Y00  61.12 40.14 1.52 0.140 
 Y01  74.66 30.70 2.43 0.023 
 Y02  54.98 37.24 1.48 0.152 
 Y03  90.24 26.23 3.44 0.002 
 Y04  119.69 26.93 4.44 0.000 
 Y05  147.68 27.39 5.39 <.0001 
 Variables are: Yield Spread = The basis point spread (100 basis points = 1%) between the
yield to maturity of the sample bond and the comparable treasury bond; TRI is the pounds 
of toxic chemicals released to land, air or water per thousand dollars of U.S. Sales;  
Leverage = total debt divided by total assets; Coverage = earnings before interest and 
taxes divided by interest expense; Current = (current assets minus current liabilities) 
divided by total assets; Volatility = annualised standard deviation of the sample firms‟ 
mean returns for the year prior to the bond trade used to calculate yield spread.; Size = 
total market value of equity.  N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are 





Table 9, panel B : Alternate Regression 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread =    α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Leverage + α3Coverage +  
α4Current + α5Volatility + α6Size + ε  
Method:  Two way random effects, year and firm (FGLS).   
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  -64.86 39.40 -1.65 0.1013 0.3697 
TRI/US Sales  20.74 6.77 3.06 0.0013 
 Leverage + 184.78 44.75 4.13 <.0001 
 Coverage – -2.88 2.33 -1.24 0.1084 
 Current – 67.58 152.00 0.44 0.3285 
 Volatility + 702.23 116.10 6.05 <.0001 
 Size – -0.0008 0.0017 -0.46 0.3230 
 Variables are: Yield Spread = The basis point spread (100 basis points = 1%) between the yield to 
maturity of the sample bond and the comparable treasury bond; TRI is the pounds of toxic 
chemicals released to land, air or water per thousand dollars of U.S. Sales;  Leverage = total debt 
divided by total assets; Coverage = earnings before interest and taxes divided by interest expense; 
Current = (current assets minus current liabilities) divided by total assets; Volatility = annualised 
standard deviation of the sample firms‟ mean returns for the year prior to the bond trade used to 
calculate yield spread.; Size = total market value of equity.  N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is 





Table 10: Davidson MacKinnon J Test 
Panel A: Equation 4a 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + β1Predicted Value of Eq’n (5) + ε 
Method:  OLS 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
Adj. R-
squared 
Intercept  -16.55 33.48 -0.49 0.6216 0.6727 
TRI/US Sales + 11.40 6.09 1.87 0.0315 
 Modified Bond Rating + 28.29 3.02 9.38 <.0001 
 Z-Score – -25.24 9.65 -2.61 0.0048 
 Volatility – 468.14 211.74 2.21 0.0141 
 Maturity + 1.35 0.70 1.94 0.0539 
 Aaa Spread  0.37 0.10 3.72 0.0002 
 Predict Value Eq‟n 5  0.32 0.23 1.43 0.1553 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables as per table 1, 
panel B. Predict Value Eq‟n 5 is the predicted value from a regression of equation 5.  Errors are 
White‟s standard errors.   
 
Table 10, panel B: Equation 5a 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread =    α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Leverage + α3Coverage +  
α4Current + α5Volatility + α6Size + β2Predicted Value of Eq’n (4) + ε  
Method:  OLS 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
Adj. R-
squared 
Intercept  12.80 22.58 0.57 0.5716 0.6721 
TRI/US Sales + -0.39 4.80 -0.08 0.9346 
 Leverage + 3.35 36.19 0.09 0.4632 
 Coverage – -0.44 1.91 -0.23 0.4089 
 Current – -245.39 106.25 -2.31 0.0110 
 Volatility + 22.03 103.78 0.21 0.4161 
 Predict Value Eq‟n 4  1.00 0.10 10.01 <.0001 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables as per table 8. 





Table 11: Outliers 
Equation (4) without sample outliers based on Cook’s D of 0.020 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + ε 
Method:  Cluster in one-dimension (Firm), One-way fixed effects (Year). N = 190 firm-
years, 26 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
squared 
Intercept  -56.68 30.54 -1.86 0.0753 
0.7971 
 
TRI/US Sales + 17.78 3.32 5.36 <.0001 
 Modified Bond Rating + 26.55 3.23 8.22 <.0001 
 Z-Score - -35.98 8.46 -4.25 0.0002 
 Volatility + 511.34 126.30 4.05 0.0002 
 Maturity  2.31 0.54 4.27 0.0002 
 Aaa Spread + 0.82 0.19 4.23 0.0002 
 Y95  3.65 16.63 0.22 0.8283 
 Y96  -3.64 12.25 -0.3 0.7691 
 Y97  14.04 19.94 0.7 0.4878 
 Y98  -9.62 19.51 -0.49 0.6261 
 Y99  77.30 27.64 2.8 0.0098 
 Y00  4.32 27.74 0.16 0.8776 
 Y01  -6.51 25.17 -0.26 0.7982 
 Y02  -66.68 43.42 -1.54 0.1372 
 Y03  -72.07 28.90 -2.49 0.0196 
 Y04  44.10 24.92 1.77 0.0890 
 Y05  105.85 21.70 4.88 <.0001 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables are as per Table 
1, Panel B, except year indicators.  Year indicators are binary variables, years 1995 through 2005, 




Table 12: Bond specific features 
Panel A: Call 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + α7Call + ε  
Method:  Cluster in one-dimension (Firm), One-way fixed effects (Year). N = 204 firm-
years, 26 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
Squared 
Intercept  -65.37 63.70 -1.03 0.3146 0.7209 
TRI/US Sales + 16.82 5.01 3.35 0.0025 
 Modified Bond Rating + 29.82 6.47 4.61 0.0001 
 Z-Score – -37.23 10.88 -3.42 0.0022 
 Volatility + 633.35 164.57 3.85 0.0007 
 Maturity  1.70 0.74 2.3 0.0303 
 Aaa Spread + 0.84 0.39 2.16 0.0406 
 Call + 6.46 17.49 0.37 0.3300 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables as per table 1, 
panel B.  Call is an indicator variable indicating the bond is callable.  
Table 12, Panel B : Covenant Index 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + Cov Index + ε  
Method:  Cluster in one-dimension (Firm), One-way fixed effects (Year). N = 188 firm-
years, 26 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
Squared 
Intercept  -122.21 87.09 -1.4 0.1728 0.7357 
TRI/US Sales + 15.15 5.54 2.74 0.0057 
 Modified Bond Rating + 24.26 6.51 3.73 0.0005 
 Z-Score – -35.45 11.96 -2.96 0.0033 
 Volatility + 638.04 165.45 3.86 0.0004 
 Maturity  2.17 0.85 2.56 0.0168 
 Aaa Spread + 0.97 0.47 2.08 0.0239 
 Cov Index  4.99 4.45 1.12 0.1365 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables as per table 1, 




Table 12, Panel C : Call and Covenant Index 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/US Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + α7Cov Index + ε  
Method:  Cluster in one-dimension (Firm), One-way fixed effects (Year). N = 188 firm-
years, 26 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
Squared 
Intercept  -116.22 89.08 -1.30 0.2039 0.7367 
TRI/US Sales + 14.80 5.47 2.70 0.0061 
 Modified Bond Rating + 24.08 6.69 3.60 0.0007 
 Z-Score – -35.76 11.49 -3.11 0.0023 
 Volatility + 626.01 161.60 3.87 0.0004 
 Maturity  2.05 0.96 2.15 0.0419 
 Aaa Spread + 0.97 0.47 2.06 0.0252 
 Call + 10.47 19.06 0.55 0.1469 
 Cov Index  4.51 4.61 0.98 0.1687 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables as per table 1, 
panel B.  Call is an indicator variable indicating the bond is callable.  Cov Index is the number of 




Table 13: Addressing non-pulp and paper sales 
Panel A : TRI scaled by pulp and paper segment sales 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/P&P Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score 
+ α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + ε  
Method:  Cluster in one-dimension (Firm), One-way fixed effects (Year). N = 204 firm-
years, 26 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
Squared 
Intercept  -59.29 67.23 -0.88 0.3862 0.7048 
TRI/P&P Sales + 8.58 6.48 1.32 0.0988 
 Modified Bond Rating + 29.41 5.92 4.97 <.0001 
 Z-Score – -43.21 11.35 -3.81 0.0004 
 Volatility + 704.09 158.83 4.43 0.0001 
 Maturity  2.00 0.75 2.68 0.0130 
 Aaa Spread + 0.89 0.40 2.25 0.0169 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables as per table 1, 
panel B.  TRI/P&P Sales is total TRI scaled by a firms‟ pulp and paper sales.  Fixed effects year 
indicators are not reported. 
 
Table 13, Panel B : TRI scaled by pulp and paper segment sales 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/P&P Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score 
+ α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + ε  
Method:  Two way random effects, year and firm (FGLS).   
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
Squared 
Intercept  -13.20 46.82 -0.28 0.7783 0.4796 
TRI/P&P Sales + 12.88 6.60 1.95 0.0261 
 Modified Bond Rating + 30.37 4.08 7.44 <.0001 
 Z-Score – -52.63 7.78 -6.77 <.0001 
 Volatility + 824.97 101.40 8.14 <.0001 
 Maturity  2.25 0.79 2.85 0.0049 
 Aaa Spread + 0.51 0.16 3.14 0.0010 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables as per table 1, 





Table 13, Panel C: Percent non-pulp and paper sales 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/U.S. Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + α7Percent non P&P + ε   
Method:  Cluster in one-dimension (Firm), One-way fixed effects (Year). N = 204 firm-
years, 26 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
Squared 
Intercept  -82.05 67.90 -1.21 0.2382 0.7213 
TRI/US Sales + 17.71 5.09 3.48 0.0009 
 Modified Bond Rating + 30.35 6.23 4.87 <.0001 
 Z-Score – -35.63 11.27 -3.16 0.0021 
 Volatility + 667.43 170.19 3.92 0.0003 
 Maturity  1.70 0.63 2.68 0.0127 
 Aaa Spread + 0.86 0.39 2.20 0.0188 
 Percent non P&P  22.43 35.57 0.63 0.5341 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables as per table 1, 
panel B.  Percent non P&P is non pulp and paper sales divided by total sales.  Fixed effects year 
indicators are not reported. 
Table 13, Panel D: Interaction of TRI and non-pulp and paper indicator 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/U.S. Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + α7High Non-P&P + α8TRI/US 
Sales*High Non-P&P + ε   
Method:  Cluster in one-dimension (Firm), One-way fixed effects (Year). N = 204 firm-
years, 26 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
Squared 
Intercept  -94.34 75.00 -1.26 0.2201 0.7233 
TRI/US Sales + 22.26 8.46 2.63 0.0072 
 Modified Bond Rating + 30.15 6.16 4.90 <.0001 
 Z-Score – -34.21 11.87 -2.88 0.0040 
 Volatility + 656.81 166.94 3.93 0.0003 
 Maturity ? 1.56 0.63 2.48 0.0204 
 Aaa Spread + 0.88 0.41 2.16 0.0205 
 High Non-P&P ? 32.27 28.51 1.13 0.2685 
 TRI/US Sales*High 
Non-P&P – -10.52 10.02 -1.05 0.1520 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables as per table 1, 
panel B; except Non-P&P Indicator which is an indicator variable of „1‟ if a firm is above the 
sample median for non-pulp and paper sales, „0‟ otherwise and TRI/US Sales*High Non-P&P, 
which is an interaction variable between TRI/US Sales and High Non-P&P Indicator.  Fixed 








Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/U.S. Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + α7High Non-US + α8TRI/US 
Sales*High Non-US + ε  
Method:  Cluster in one-dimension (Firm), One-way fixed effects (Year). N = 204 firm-
years, 26 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
Squared 
Intercept  -97.85 75.90 -1.29 0.2091 0.7269 
TRI/US Sales + 29.10 7.74 3.76 0.0005 
 Modified Bond Rating + 29.94 6.41 4.67 <.0001 
 Z-Score – -38.89 10.43 -3.73 0.0005 
 Volatility + 677.66 154.85 4.38 0.0001 
 Maturity ? 1.85 0.70 2.64 0.0141 
 Aaa Spread + 0.86 0.41 2.09 0.0237 
 High Non-US ? 35.25 33.22 1.06 0.2987 
 TRI/US Sales*High           
Non-US   – -18.50 10.75 -1.72 0.0489 
 Y95  -2.75 17.96 -0.15 0.8797 
 Y96  12.20 19.19 0.64 0.5308 
 Y97  23.10 20.15 1.15 0.2624 
 Y98  -1.76 22.73 -0.08 0.9390 
 Y99  64.17 36.89 1.74 0.0942 
 Y00  0.10 50.93 0.00 0.9985 
 Y01  -9.35 43.70 -0.21 0.8324 
 Y02  -57.86 71.59 -0.81 0.4266 
 Y03  -54.93 48.08 -1.14 0.2641 
 Y04  52.31 30.42 1.72 0.0979 
 Y05  98.13 36.76 2.67 0.0131 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables as per table 1, 
panel B.  High Non U.S. indicates that the firm-year‟s sales are above the sample median.  High 




Table 15: Changes model 
Model:  
 
ΔYield Spread = α0 + α1ΔTRI/U.S. Sales + α2ΔModified Bond Rating +  
α3ΔZ-Score + α4ΔVolatility + α5ΔMaturity + α6ΔAaa Spread + ε   
Method:  OLS. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
Adj. R-
Squared 
Intercept  -58.95 22.79 -2.59 0.0106 0.2430 
ΔTRI/US Sales + 13.01 9.41 1.38 0.0843 
 ΔModified Bond Rating + 20.94 8.55 2.45 0.0077 
 ΔZ-Score – -25.16 15.35 -1.64 0.0516 
 ΔVolatility + 658.56 125.00 5.27 <.0001 
 ΔMaturity  -85.56 23.66 -3.62 0.0004 
 ΔAaa Spread + 0.25 0.11 2.23 0.0137 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables are first differences 




Table 16: Duration 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/U.S. Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Duration + α6Aaa Spread + ε   
Method:  Cluster in one-dimension (Firm), One-way fixed effects (Year). N = 204 firm-
years, 26 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
Squared 
Intercept  -67.38 64.04 -1.05 0.3028 0.7168 
TRI/US Sales + 17.31 5.24 3.31 0.0015 
 Modified Bond Rating + 29.57 6.30 4.7 <.0001 
 Z-Score – -37.71 10.99 -3.43 0.0011 
 Volatility + 637.71 169.11 3.77 0.0005 
 Duration  3.84 1.78 2.15 0.0410 
 Aaa Spread + 0.83 0.39 2.12 0.0219 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables as per table 1, panel 








Table 17: Bond Rating as control variable 
Panel A: Bond Rating as 1 to 22 scale, where AAA+ = 1, AAA = 2, etc. 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/U.S. Sales + α2Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + ε   
Method:  Cluster in one-dimension (Firm), One-way fixed effects (Year). N = 204 firm-
years, 26 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
Squared 
Intercept  -426.52 63.82 -6.68 <.0001 
0.7358 
 
TRI/US Sales + 6.73 4.79 1.40 0.0865 
 Bond Rating + 32.30 6.06 5.33 <.0001 
 Z-Score – 8.04 12.22 0.66 0.2584 
 Volatility + 309.54 198.73 1.56 0.0660 
 Maturity  1.79 0.60 2.97 0.0064 
 Aaa Spread + 0.84 0.38 2.19 0.0192 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables as per table 1, 
panel B.  Bond Rating is the bond rating after being transformed to a scale of 1 to 22 where AAA+ 
= 1, AAA = 2, etc.  Fixed effects year indicators are not reported. 
 




Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/U.S. Sales + α2Log of Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + ε   
Method:  Cluster in one-dimension (Firm), One-way fixed effects (Year). N = 204 firm-
years, 26 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
Squared 
Intercept  276.40 267.23 1.03 0.3109 
0.6736 
 
TRI/US Sales + 12.68 5.46 2.32 0.0143 
 Log of Bond Rating – -369.52 210.40 -1.76 0.0457 
 Z-Score – -13.34 11.37 -1.17 0.1261 
 Volatility + 671.15 249.42 2.69 0.0063 
 Maturity  1.59 0.78 2.03 0.0528 
 Aaa Spread + 0.86 0.40 2.17 0.0200 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables as per table 1, 
panel B.  Log of Bond Rating is the log of the bond rating after being transformed to a scale of 1 





Table 18: Investment Grade Bonds Only 
Panel A: Equation (4) with investment grade bonds only 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/U.S. Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + ε   
Method:  Cluster in one-dimension (Firm), One-way fixed effects (Year). N = 156 firm-
years, 21 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
Squared 
Intercept  -129.27 61.76 -2.09 0.0493 
0.6843 
 
TRI/US Sales + 7.93 5.31 1.49 0.0754 
 Modified Bond Rating + 13.55 3.26 4.16 0.0003 
 Z-Score – -19.65 7.35 -2.67 0.0073 
 Volatility + 288.58 122.15 2.36 0.0142 
 Maturity  2.59 0.62 4.21 0.0004 
 Aaa Spread + 1.31 0.50 2.63 0.0080 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables as per table 1, 
panel B.  Fixed effects year indicators are not reported. 
 




Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/U.S. Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Maturity + α6Aaa Spread + ε   
Method:  Cluster in one-dimension (Firm), One-way fixed effects (Year). N = 48 firm-
years, 11 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
Squared 
Intercept  252.60 94.25 2.68 0.0231 
0.5183 
 
TRI/US Sales + 1.15 7.92 0.14 0.4439 
 Modified Bond Rating – -3.08 10.31 -0.30 0.7713 
 Z-Score – -40.67 17.23 -2.36 0.0200 
 Volatility + 308.27 257.81 1.20 0.1297 
 Maturity  -6.12 3.66 -1.67 0.1255 
 Aaa Spread + 0.38 0.38 1.01 0.1675 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables as per table 1, 




Table 19: Firm specific reports on # of times named as a PRP 
Firm Year PRP from 10-K PRP Estimate 
Abitibi Con 1998 0 0 
Abitibi Con 1999 0 0 
Abitibi Con 2000 0 0 
Abitibi Con 2001 0 0 
Abitibi Con 2002 0 0 
Abitibi Con 2003 0 0 
Abitibi Con 2004 0 0 
Abitibi Con 2005 0 0 
Bowater 1994 2 2 
Bowater 1995 0 0 
Bowater 1996 0 0 
Bowater 1997 0 0 
Bowater 1998 0 0 
Bowater 1999 0 0 
Bowater 2000 0 0 
Bowater 2001 3 3 
Bowater 2002 3 3 
Bowater 2003 4 4 
Bowater 2004 3 3 
Bowater 2005 3 3 
DOMTAR INC 2001 A number 20 
DOMTAR INC 2002 A number 20 
DOMTAR INC 2003 A number 20 
DOMTAR INC 2004 A number 20 
DOMTAR INC 2005 A number 20 
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP 1994 Numerous 200 
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP 1995 Numerous 200 
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP 1996 200 200 
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP 1997 208 208 
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP 1998 173 173 
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP 1999 173 173 
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP 2000 194 194 
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP 2001 170 170 
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP 2002 172 172 
GEORGIA-PACIFIC CORP 2003 171 171 




Table 19, Cont’d – Firm specific reports on # of times names as a Potentially Responsible Party 
Firm Year PRP from 10-K PRP Estimate 
RAYONIER INC 1994 4 4 
RAYONIER INC 1995 4 4 
RAYONIER INC 1996 6 6 
RAYONIER INC 1997 8 8 
RAYONIER INC 1998 8 8 
RAYONIER INC 1999 7 7 
INTL PAPER CO 1994 71 71 
INTL PAPER CO 1995 68 68 
INTL PAPER CO 1996 73 73 
INTL PAPER CO 1997 73 73 
INTL PAPER CO 1998 71 71 
INTL PAPER CO 1999 108 108 
INTL PAPER CO 2000 97 97 
INTL PAPER CO 2001 114 114 
INTL PAPER CO 2002 117 117 
INTL PAPER CO 2003 117 117 
INTL PAPER CO 2004 88 88 
INTL PAPER CO 2005 90 90 
JAMES RIVER 1995 50 50 
JAMES RIVER 1996 50 50 
FORT JAMES CORP 1997 Various 10 
FORT JAMES CORP 1998 Various 10 
FORT JAMES CORP 1999 Various 10 
SMURFIT-STONE CORP 1998 A number 20 
SMURFIT-STONE CORP 1999 A number 20 
SMURFIT-STONE CORP 2000 A number 20 
SMURFIT-STONE CORP 2001 A number 20 
SMURFIT-STONE CORP 2002 A number 20 
SMURFIT-STONE CORP 2003 A number 20 
SMURFIT-STONE CORP 2004 A number 20 




Table 19, Cont’d. – Firm specific reports on # of times names as a Potentially Responsible Party 
Firm Year PRP from 10-K PRP Estimate 
KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP 1994 28 28 
KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP 1995 A number 28 
KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP 1996 A number 28 
KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP 1997 A number 28 
KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP 1998 A number 28 
KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP 1999 A number 28 
KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP 2000 A number 28 
KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP 2001 A number 28 
KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP 2002 A number 28 
KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP 2003 A number 28 
KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP 2004 A number 28 
KIMBERLY-CLARK CORP 2005 A number 28 
POTLATCH CORP 1994 0 0 
POTLATCH CORP 1995 0 0 
POTLATCH CORP 1996 0 0 
POTLATCH CORP 1997 0 0 
POTLATCH CORP 1998 0 0 
POTLATCH CORP 1999 0 0 
POTLATCH CORP 2000 0 0 
POTLATCH CORP 2001 0 0 
POTLATCH CORP 2002 0 0 
POTLATCH CORP 2003 0 0 
POTLATCH CORP 2004 0 0 
POTLATCH CORP 2005 0 0 
SONOCO PRODUCTS CO 1994 Several 10 
SONOCO PRODUCTS CO 1995 Several 10 
SONOCO PRODUCTS CO 1996 Several 10 
SONOCO PRODUCTS CO 1997 Several 10 
SONOCO PRODUCTS CO 1998 Several 10 
SONOCO PRODUCTS CO 1999 Several 10 
SONOCO PRODUCTS CO 2000 Several 10 
SONOCO PRODUCTS CO 2001 Several 10 
SONOCO PRODUCTS CO 2002 Several 10 
SONOCO PRODUCTS CO 2003 Several 10 
SONOCO PRODUCTS CO 2004 Several 10 




Table 19, Cont’d. – Firm specific reports on # of times names as a Potentially Responsible Party 
Firm Year PRP from 10-K PRP Estimate 
STONE CONTAINER CORP 1994 A number 20 
STONE CONTAINER CORP 1995 A number 20 
STONE CONTAINER CORP 1996 A number 20 
STONE CONTAINER CORP 1997 A number 20 
TEMPLE-INLAND INC 1994 numerous 9 
TEMPLE-INLAND INC 1995 numerous 9 
TEMPLE-INLAND INC 1996 numerous 9 
TEMPLE-INLAND INC 1997 numerous 9 
TEMPLE-INLAND INC 1998 numerous 9 
TEMPLE-INLAND INC 1999 numerous 9 
TEMPLE-INLAND INC 2000 9 9 
TEMPLE-INLAND INC 2001 9 9 
TEMPLE-INLAND INC 2002 8 8 
TEMPLE-INLAND INC 2003 5 5 
TEMPLE-INLAND INC 2004 6 6 
TEMPLE-INLAND INC 2005 4 4 
WAUSAU PAPER CORP 1997 0 0 
WAUSAU PAPER CORP 1998 0 0 
WAUSAU PAPER CORP 1999 0 0 
WAUSAU PAPER CORP 2000 0 0 
WAUSAU PAPER CORP 2001 0 0 
WAUSAU PAPER CORP 2002 0 0 
WAUSAU PAPER CORP 2003 0 0 
WAUSAU PAPER CORP 2004 0 0 
WAUSAU PAPER CORP 2005 0 0 
WESTVACO 1994 several 10 
WESTVACO 1995 several 10 
WESTVACO 1996 several 10 
WESTVACO 1997 several 10 
WESTVACO 1998 several 10 
WESTVACO 1999 A number 20 
WESTVACO 2000 A number 20 
WESTVACO 2001 A number 20 
MEADWESTVACO CORP 2002 numerous 50 
MEADWESTVACO CORP 2003 numerous 50 
MEADWESTVACO CORP 2004 numerous 50 




Table 19, Cont’d. – Firm specific reports on # of times names as a Potentially Responsible Party 
Firm Year PRP from 10-K PRP Estimate 
MEAD CORP 1994 31 31 
MEAD CORP 1995 22 22 
MEAD CORP 1996 18 18 
MEAD CORP 1997 25 25 
MEAD CORP 1998 26 26 
MEAD CORP 1999 26 26 
MEAD CORP 2000 26 26 
WEYERHAEUSER CO 1994 36 36 
WEYERHAEUSER CO 1995 41 41 
WEYERHAEUSER CO 1996 43 43 
WEYERHAEUSER CO 1997 43 43 
WEYERHAEUSER CO 1998 numerous 50 
WEYERHAEUSER CO 1999 numerous 50 
WEYERHAEUSER CO 2000 numerous 50 
WEYERHAEUSER CO 2001 numerous 50 
WEYERHAEUSER CO 2002 79 79 
WEYERHAEUSER CO 2003 73 73 
WEYERHAEUSER CO 2004 67 67 
WEYERHAEUSER CO 2005 70 70 
ROCK-TENN CO 1994 8 8 
ROCK-TENN CO 1995 8 8 
ROCK-TENN CO 1996 8 8 
ROCK-TENN CO 1997 10 10 
ROCK-TENN CO 1998 9 9 
ROCK-TENN CO 1999 9 9 
ROCK-TENN CO 2000 8 8 
ROCK-TENN CO 2001 8 8 
ROCK-TENN CO 2002 10 10 
ROCK-TENN CO 2003 11 11 
ROCK-TENN CO 2004 9 9 





Table 19, Cont’d. – Firm specific reports on # of times names as a Potentially Responsible Party 
Firm Year PRP from 10-K PRP Estimate 
BUCKEYE TECHNOLOGIES 1996 0 0 
BUCKEYE TECHNOLOGIES 1997 0 0 
BUCKEYE TECHNOLOGIES 1998 0 0 
BUCKEYE TECHNOLOGIES 1999 0 0 
BUCKEYE TECHNOLOGIES 2000 0 0 
BUCKEYE TECHNOLOGIES 2001 0 0 
BUCKEYE TECHNOLOGIES 2002 0 0 
BUCKEYE TECHNOLOGIES 2003 0 0 
BUCKEYE TECHNOLOGIES 2004 0 0 
BUCKEYE TECHNOLOGIES 2005 0 0 
FORT HOWARD CORP 1994 1 1 
FORT HOWARD CORP 1995 2 2 
UNION CAMP CORP 1994 A number 14 
UNION CAMP CORP 1995 A number 14 
UNION CAMP CORP 1996 14 14 
UNION CAMP CORP 1997 14 14 
CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL 1994 A number 20 
CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL 1995 A number 20 
CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL 1996 A number 20 
CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL 1997 A number 20 
CHAMPION INTERNATIONAL 1998 A number 20 
WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES 1994 0 0 
WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES 1995 0 0 
WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES 1996 0 0 
WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES 1997 0 0 
WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES 1998 0 0 
WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES 1999 0 0 
WILLAMETTE INDUSTRIES 2000 0 0 
GAYLORD CONTAINER CP 1995 0 0 
GAYLORD CONTAINER CP 1996 0 0 
GAYLORD CONTAINER CP 1997 0 0 
GAYLORD CONTAINER CP 1998 0 0 






Table 20: PRP Pearson Correlations 
Variable 
# of times 
PRP 
PRP / Total 
Assets 
PRP Est / 
Tot Assets 
PRP / US 
Sales 
PRP Est / 
US Sales 
Yield Spread -0.0579 -0.1923 -0.1524 -0.2333 -0.1645 
p-value 0.5128 0.0284 0.0295 0.0076 0.0187 
TRI/US Sales -0.1966 -0.4351 -0.3356 -0.4044 -0.1993 
p-value 0.0250 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0043 
Bond Scale -0.1010 -0.1194 -0.0622 -0.1863 -0.0864 
p-value 0.2527 0.1759 0.3771 0.0339 0.2194 
Modified Bond Rating -0.1641 0.1313 0.1389 -0.0202 -0.0148 
p-value 0.0622 0.1365 0.0476 0.8200 0.8334 
Volatility -0.0900 -0.0030 -0.0444 -0.1152 -0.1427 
p-value 0.3088 0.9730 0.5284 0.1919 0.0418 
Z-Score -0.1413 0.2569 0.1754 0.1041 0.0153 
p-value 0.1088 0.0032 0.0121 0.2386 0.8279 
Maturity 0.2484 0.0845 0.1272 0.0820 0.1029 
p-value 0.0044 0.3392 0.0699 0.3536 0.1432 
Aaa Spread 0.0527 -0.0927 -0.0759 -0.0610 -0.0090 
p-value 0.5513 0.2943 0.2807 0.4908 0.8979 
Leverage -0.0814 -0.1656 -0.1129 -0.1779 -0.1237 
p-value 0.3570 0.0598 0.1080 0.0429 0.0780 
Coverage -0.1343 0.2674 0.1662 0.1253 0.0126 
p-value 0.1277 0.0021 0.0175 0.1553 0.8580 
Current -0.2789 -0.0405 -0.0327 -0.1667 -0.1384 
p-value 0.0013 0.6472 0.6423 0.0580 0.0484 
Size 0.6315 0.1166 0.0190 0.2911 0.0909 
p-value <.0001 0.1866 0.7875 0.0008 0.1962 
# of time PRP is the number of times a firm has been named as a PRP (n=130).  PRP/Total 
Assets is the number of times a firm is named as a PRP scaled by total assets (n = 130).   
(U.S. sales).  PRP Est/Tot Assets is the number of times a firms is named as a PRP, including 
an estimate for firms that do not explicitly report, scales by total assets (n=204).  PRP/US 
Sales and PRP Est/US Sales are the same measures, scaled by U.S. sales rather than total 






Table 21: PRP as a control variable 
Panel A: Number of times named as PRP, scaled by total assets 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/U.S. Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Duration + α6Aaa Spread + α7PRP/Total Assets  + ε   
Method:  Cluster in one-dimension (Firm), One-way fixed effects (Year). N = 130 firm-
years, 18 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
Squared 
Intercept  11.99 76.51 0.16 0.8773 0.7629 
TRI/US Sales + 9.85 4.44 2.22 0.0203 
 Modified Bond Rating + 33.14 7.76 4.27 0.0003 
 Z-Score – -50.41 5.47 -9.21 <.0001 
 Volatility + 593.21 169.02 3.51 0.0014 
 Maturity  2.15 0.66 3.24 0.0048 
 Aaa Spread + 0.78 0.47 1.65 0.1182 
 PRP/Total Assets  -2839.02 2151.06 -1.32 0.2044 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables as per table 1, 
panel B.  PRP/Total Assets is the number of times a firm is named as a potentially responsible 
party on a U.S. EPA Superfund site, scaled by total assets.  Fixed effects year indicators are not 
reported. 
Table 21, panel B: Estimate of number of times named as PRP, scaled by total assets 
Model:  
 
Yield Spread = α0 + α1TRI/U.S. Sales + α2Modified Bond Rating + α3Z-Score + 
α4Volatility + α5Duration + α6Aaa Spread + α7PRP Est/Total Assets  + ε  
Method:  Cluster in one-dimension (Firm), One-way fixed effects (Year). N = 204 firm-
years, 26 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
Squared 
Intercept  -47.49 61.93 -0.77 0.4504 0.7256 
TRI/US Sales + 14.26 5.50 2.59 0.0078 
 Modified Bond Rating + 31.48 6.27 5.02 <.0001 
 Z-Score – -37.47 10.43 -3.59 0.0007 
 Volatility + 642.18 148.49 4.32 0.0001 
 Maturity  1.97 0.77 2.55 0.0086 
 Aaa Spread + 0.84 0.39 2.15 0.0206 
 PRP Est/Total Assets  -3199.32 2317.69 -1.38 0.1797 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables as per table 1, 
panel B.  PRP Est/Total Assets is the number of times a firm is named as a potentially responsible 
party on a U.S. EPA Superfund site, scaled by total assets.  For firms that do not report the specific 






Table 22: Lag of TRI/US Sales 
Model:  
 
Yield Spreadit = α0 + α1TRI/U.S. Salesit–1 + α2Modified Bond Ratingit  
+ α3Z-Scoreit + α4Volatilityit + α5Maturityit + α6Aaa Spreadit + ε   
Method:  Cluster in one-dimension (Firm), One-way fixed effects (Year). N = 178 firm-
years, 26 firms. 
Variable 
Predicted 
Sign Estimate Error t-value Pr > |t| 
R-
Squared 
Intercept  -58.78 63.87 -0.92 0.3662 0.7073 
Lag TRI/US Sales + 14.46 4.43 3.26 0.0016 
 Modified Bond Rating + 30.89 6.69 4.62 0.0001 
 Z-Score – -36.86 11.52 -3.2 0.0019 
 Volatility + 589.76 183.47 3.21 0.0018 
 Maturity  2.00 0.79 2.54 0.0178 
 Aaa Spread + 0.81 0.41 1.99 0.0286 
 N.B. Where the sign of a parameter is predicted, t-tests are one-tailed.  Variables as per table 1, 
panel B.  Lag TRI/US Sales is TRI/US Sales for the calendar year prior to the fiscal year for each 
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